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Since the advent of democracy in 1994, South Africa has experienced an 
unprecedented rise in the frequency and intensity of community protests. Most of the 
available empirical evidence locates the high levels of unemployment, inequality, 
poverty and discontentment with the quality of democracy at the centre of the 
exponential growth of community protest action in the country (Alexander, 2010; 
Hough, 2008; Manyaka, 2018; Mottiar and Bond, 2012; Paret and Runciman, 2016; 
Twala, 2014). Despite the growing magnitude of community protest activity, there is a 
paucity of scholarly work that concentrates on analysing how municipalities respond 
to community protests and the factors that inform municipal responses. I argue that 
existing scholarship has limited its focus mainly to examining the impacts of the prior 
application of restrictions on the right to protest from securocratic analytical lenses 
(Duncan, 2014; 2016; Royeppen, 2016) or on examining the impacts of the immediate 
responses of the police to community protests (Dixon, 2015; Marks and Bruce, 2015; 
Mkhize, 2015; and Omar, 2006). However, scholars have paid scant attention to 
analysing what happens inside municipalities when community protests erupt and how 
the institutional environment of municipal institutions shape their responses to 
community protests. It is this gap in the body of literature that this dissertation seeks 
to address. Using in-depth, semi-structured qualitative interviews with political and 
administrative officials employed at the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 
(CTMM), this case study examines the nature of municipal responses to community 
protests alongside the factors that influence the capacity of the municipality to respond 
to these protests. The findings of this dissertation conceptualise municipal responses 
to community protests as political and administrative. This conceptualisation arose 
from a thematic analysis of participant accounts describing the nature of municipal 
responses. The analysis shows that political responses primarily seek to restore order 
in communities and to de-escalate community protests, while administrative 
responses are municipal interventions that address community protest demands 
reactively. The significance of these findings is that they provide alternative entry 
points for analysing municipal responses beyond the confines of securocratic 
perspectives of institutional responses to community protests. Furthermore, this 





with the structural position of the municipality in the country’s system of multi-level 
governance informs administrative and political responses to community protests. At 
the level of institutional dynamics, this dissertation presents four main findings. First, 
it demonstrates that the Regulation of Gatherings Act (RGA) of 1993 is sometimes 
used as an instrument to measure the legitimacy of community protests. This analysis 
is evidenced by the insistence of political and administrative officials that communities 
need to seek ‘permission’ to qualify their collective action as legitimate expressions of 
dissatisfaction. Second, the tendency among political and administrative officials to 
predominantly view community protests as expressions of political factionalism could 
result in misdirected municipal responses to community protests. Third, the 
institutional and legal emphasis on regulatory compliance with financial regulations 
sometimes place contradictory pressures on political and administrative officials. Here, 
the analysis illustrates the lived pressures municipal officials experience as a result of 
the limitations that inadequate fiscal resources and rigid financial regulations impose 
on the protest response choices available to them. The pressures arising from these 
conditions arguably prioritise institutional compliance with financial regulations over 
community needs. In addition, the findings further reflect the harmful side effects of 
political factionalism as they seep into the administrative domain of the CTMM. This 
trend contributes to institutional conditions under which administrative staff feel stuck 
at the centre of the political contestation that characterises the municipality and, in 
turn, undermines the institutional capacity of the municipality to respond to community 
protests. Finally, at the level of structural factors, the findings demonstrate that 
uncertainty about the functional competencies of the different spheres of government 
and complex intergovernmental relations further complicate municipal responses to 
community protests. This dissertation contributes to debates of municipal responses 
to community protests within its appropriate institutional context and from the 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
The dawn of democracy in South Africa in 1994 came along with heightened hopes 
and optimism for the formation of a more egalitarian society, where the aspirations 
and needs of all citizens would take centre stage. The democratically elected 
government has made notable strides in expanding access to basic services and 
improving the quality of life for many citizens. This progress is partially reflected by the 
increase in household access to piped water from 7.23 million in 1996 to 14.35 million 
in 2017, whereas access to basic sanitation services expanded from 4.5 million to 
13.32 million in 2017 (Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME), 
2019:199-200). At the same time, household access to electricity also grew 
substantially from 4.7 million connections in 1994 to 13.7 million in 2017 (DPME, 
2019:200).  
Despite these gains, the initial euphoria that accompanied the transition seems 
to have been short-lived and dissipated rather rapidly following the first decade of 
democracy. This is evidenced by the recurrent eruption of community protests across 
the country – frequently leaving communities and municipalities paralysed by 
instability and disorder (Alexander, Runciman, Ngwane, Moloto, Mokgele and Van 
Staden, 2018; Bond, 2010; L. Lancaster, 2016). Alongside, the upswing in the 
frequency of community protests, a new wave of scholarship examining why 
communities communicate their grievances using protest action emerged. These 
analytical accounts offer multiple ways of understanding why communities use protest 
action over invited spaces of participation to communicate with elected 
representatives and state institutions.  
Some scholars situate the predominance of community protests in the country 
within the context of stagnant economic growth, unemployment, poverty and rising 
levels of inequality (Alexander, 2010; Hough, 2008; Manyaka, 2018; Mottiar and Bond, 
2012; Paret and Runciman, 2016; Twala, 2014). This body of scholarship shows that 
the aforementioned structural features of South Africa's post-apartheid socio-political 
and economic system compromise the ability of vulnerable communities to cope with 
the shocks it imposes. Rising levels of inflation, the increasing costs of living, exclusion 
from the economy and access to basic services often drive communities to resort to 





In contrast, scholars such as Booysen (2011; 2015), Kgatle (2017), Olver 
(2018), Von Holdt, Langa, Molapo, Mogapi, Ngubeni, Dlamini and Kirsten (2011) have 
documented that the quality of political  representation and the influence of political 
factionalism on the administrative affairs of municipalities in some instances trigger 
the eruption of community protests. At its core, this body of scholarly work reveals that 
the growing infusion of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) into the local state 
and the intensity of factionalism within the party are often connected to the 
dysfunctionality characterising municipalities. This also contributes to the inability of 
some municipalities to provide communities with stable access to basic services. 
Here, these scholars have drawn plausible connections between communal frustration 
with municipal dysfunctionality, and service delivery and the expression of 
dissatisfaction with the state of local democracy through protest action. 
Furthermore, other scholars have examined the rise of community protests 
within the limitations and failures of invited spaces of participation brought about by 
South Africa's particular model of decentralisation (Amtakia, 2013; Friedman, 2006; 
Jolobe, 2014; Piper and von Lieres, 2008; Plessing, 2017; Sebola, 2016; Skenjana 
and Kimemia, 2011). This body of work enables us to discern that invited spaces of 
participation are often dysfunctional due to their poor theoretical conceptualisation and 
practical implementation. The research of these scholars further illuminates how 
formal participatory spaces often become preoccupied with party political issues rather 
than community concerns alongside the inability of these participatory spaces to 
provide communities with real decision-making powers over local affairs.  
These different, yet intersecting, bodies of scholarship reveal that a complex 
web of structural factors, governance challenges and shortcomings inherent in the 
model of decentralisation implemented since democratisation collectively contribute to 
the prevalence of community protests in South Africa. However, research that 
systematically explores how municipalities respond to community protests and the 
factors that determine how they respond has been sparse. Previous attempts at 
studying state responses to community protests in the country tend to examine 
immediate police responses with a focus on crowd-control policing and the use of force 
(Dixon, 2015; Marks and Bruce, 2015; Mkhize, 2015; and Omar, 2006). On the other 
hand, scholars such as Jane Duncan (2014; 2016) analyse state responses in terms 





rights of citizens to engage in protest action. The thrust of Duncan’s work 
demonstrates that the South African state has adopted securocratic mechanisms to 
regulate community protests, as reflected by the manipulation of the Regulation of 
Gatherings Act (RGA) of 1993 by municipalities and increasing coercive police action 
(Duncan, 2014).  
Even though these studies significantly aid our understanding of police and 
securitised state responses, they do not adequately cast light on the institutional 
context in which political and administrative officials must contemplate and implement 
responses to community protests. Beyond media accounts depicting the excessive 
use of police force as responses to community protests from time to time, there is also 
a need to understand what happens inside municipalities when community protests 
erupt. Insight into the institutional context of municipal institutions could assist us in 
evaluating municipal responses to community protests in its appropriate institutional 
context. It is this gap in the current body of scholarship that this dissertation addresses.  
 
1.1 Research questions 
 
Against the context provided in the preceding section, this study sought to contribute 
to current debates about municipal responses to community protests. The study aimed 
to uncover how municipalities respond to community protests and the factors that 
shape their responses, rooted in the interpretations and standpoints of the political and 
administrative officials working at municipalities. I achieved these aims by asking and 
answering the following research questions: 
 
 How do municipalities respond to community protests? 
 What factors inform municipal responses to community protests? 
 
1.2 Research design  
 
This dissertation follows a qualitative research approach and single-case study design 
to explore the main research questions posed by the dissertation. I completed the data 
collection process for this study in a highly politicised institutional domain. As such, I 
encountered particular methodological and ethical challenges that were related to the 





complexity, I grappled with accessing suitable participants for the study and had to 
contemplate how to establish my credibility as a novice researcher – these 
methodological issues are explored in detail in Chapter Four. 
To answer the research questions, I conducted semi-structured in-depth 
interviews with six elite participants who were either political representatives or 
directors of municipal service delivery departments. In this dissertation, I do not use 
the term ‘elite’ to make expressions about the individual socio-economic or class 
positions of the research participants; instead, I characterise the participants as elite 
since their roles at the municipality provide them with ease of access to “power or 
policy-making” (Lilleker, 2003:7). I fully justify this characterisation of the research 
participants in Chapter Four of this dissertation. I followed a purposive sampling 
technique to recruit participants; the main criteria for inclusion in the sample being 
direct knowledge and experience of responding to community protests. 
The dissertation deployed a thematic analysis to make sense of the primary 
data collected through the semi-structured interviews. This process involved 
transcribing all the data in verbatim in preparation for the overall analysis process. 
After this, I manually coded all the data following the inductive approach of Clarke and 
Braun (2016). This approach involved a continuous process of coding and recoding 
data to ensure that I was consistent throughout the analysis process. 
 
1.3 Outline of the dissertation 
 
This literature review is divided into two chapters. Chapter two, a citizen-centred 
perspective of community protests in democratic South Africa, part one of the literature 
review, provides an analysis and synthesis of the academic literature on community 
protests. The aim of this chapter is to provide the broader context in which the research 
problem and findings of the dissertation can be situated. This chapter starts by 
providing clarity on why this dissertation uses the concept of community protests over 
service delivery protests. This is followed by a brief discussion that debates the 
frequency and magnitude of community protests in the country.  
Chapter three, reviewing South Africa’s local governance system, part two of 
the literature review, focuses on locating municipalities in the broader system of 





Next is an analysis of participation as a defining feature of South Africa's decentralised 
governance model and the main fiscal governance challenges confronting 
municipalities. I then proceed to examine the lived work experiences of administrative 
staff employed in municipalities as an entry point to better understand municipal 
responses to community protests. Finally, this chapter also demonstrates how 
previous scholarship has addressed the question of municipal responses to 
community protests, with a focus on securocratic analytical accounts.  
Chapter four, studying up - a methodological approach, justifies the use of the 
qualitative research design and a single-case study method to answer the main 
research questions. This chapter also offers a reflection on the methodological and 
ethical complexities I encountered through interviewing elite participants in a 
politicised institutional context. 
Chapter five, analysing municipal responses - a cauldron of issues, presents 
the main findings of the dissertation. This chapter opens with an analysis that 
categorises municipal responses to community protests as being political and 
administrative. Following this, the chapter brings into focus the role of internal 
institutional and structural dynamics as the key factors that shape municipal responses 
to community protests. At the level of institutional dynamics, I found that how political 
and administrative officials view community protests possibly influence municipal 
responses to these protests. Here I made two crucial observations. First, I observed a 
tendency amongst political and administrative officials to use the RGA as a gauge to 
measure the legitimacy of community protests. Second, I noticed that the practice of 
viewing community protests primarily as expressions of political factionalism could 
result in misdirected responses to community protests. In addition, the analysis 
identified that the institutional emphasis on compliance with financial regulations and 
budget processes place contradictory pressures on political and administrative 
officials. Moreover, instability in the political-administrative interface also emerged as 
a prominent internal institutional dynamic that informs the capacity of the municipality 
to respond to community protests effectively. Finally, at the level of structural factors 
associated with the relationship of municipalities to other spheres of government, this 
chapter demonstrates how the presence of tensions in intergovernmental relations 






Chapter six provides the overall conclusion of the dissertation. It starts by 
restating the main aims of the research. I then proceed with a summary of the main 
findings of the dissertation and directions for future research. In the next chapter, I 
provide an extensive review of the relevant academic literature on community protests 

































Chapter Two: A citizen-centred perspective of community protests 
in democratic South Africa 
 
 
The literature review is divided into two chapters. As part one of the literature review, 
this chapter aims to position the study in the available body of academic literature on 
community protests from a citizen-centred perspective in democratic South Africa. I 
start by tracing the rise of community protests in contemporary South Africa and why 
this dissertation favours the concept community protests over service delivery 
protests. Thereafter, the focus of the chapter turns to current debates about the 
frequency and drivers of community protests in the country. This review and synthesis 
of  the relevant academic literature provides the broader context in which the research 
problem and findings of this dissertation can be located 
 
2.1 Community protests in democratic South Africa 
 
Community protests in post-apartheid South Africa have become normalised 
expressions of citizen disillusionment with the quality of the democratic transition and 
access to basic services. Consequently, this has ignited wide scholarly interest, as 
evidenced by the expansive body of academic literature that examines why community 
protests have become such a common occurrence in recent years. There is 
widespread agreement amongst scholars that the country has experienced an 
unprecedented upsurge in the number of community protests since 2004 (Alexander, 
2010; Bohler-Muller, Roberts, Struwig, Gordon, Radebe and Alexander, 2017; 
Mbazira, 2013; Runciman, 2016). Many of these protests often find expression at the 
local level of government, where municipalities frequently become the target at which 
citizen dissatisfaction with weak service delivery and poor governance is directed. 
It is hardly surprising that these protests are often aimed at municipalities, 
because protest demands are routinely linked to the failures of local government. 
Particularly insofar as such failures relate to access to local government services and 
the quality of political representation at this level of government (Booysen, 2015; 
Morudu, 2017:4). However, scholars such as Booysen (2011:128) and Matebesi 
(2017) convincingly demonstrate that local government is increasingly expected to 





service delivery failures of the provincial and national levels of government. This 
arguably places strain on local government resources, as this situation essentially 
requires municipalities to respond to misplaced protest demands. Nevertheless, it is 
equally important to highlight that municipalities are often the closest government 
institutions communities can access. According to Piper and Anciano (2015:76), this 
closeness of citizens to local state institutions thus becomes the central frame through 
which citizens experience all state interventions. It is, therefore, not unusual that 
municipalities often find themselves at the centre of community protest action. In the 
next section, I briefly explore why the concept community protests is preferred over 
service delivery protests in this dissertation.  
 
2.2 Community protests: More than dissatisfaction with service delivery 
 
There has been a tendency in the mainstream media to describe community protests 
as service delivery’ protests. However, a range of scholars (see Alexander et al., 2018; 
Friedman, 2019; Mottiar, 2014) have eschewed this term, opting instead for the 
concept of a community protest. Ngwane (2010:18) notes that community protests 
“involve the mobilisation of a whole community around its own set of grievances and 
demands”, which presents a rupture in the repertoire of new social movement protests 
that in the past often revolved around single issue-based demands (Ngwane, 
2010:18). Alexander and her colleagues (2018:28) support this description of 
community protest by adding that it is “a protest in which collective demands are raised 
by a geographically defined community that frames its demands in support and/or 
defence of that community”. In contrast, Matebesi (2017) defines a community protest 
as: 
“collective action by residents in a highly localised area (community), 
which directly targets a local municipality over the provision of basic 
services such as water, electricity, and sanitation, including a wider 
spectrum of concerns such as housing, roads, government corruption, 
rampant crime and unemployment” (Matebesi, 2017:5) 
 
This dissertation favours these conceptions of community protests over the notion of 
service delivery protests, given that the latter often obscures the complexity and the 
wide range of concerns community protests are usually about (Alexander et al., 





For example, Alexander and her colleagues (2018) argue that community 
protests frequently also offer critiques about the quality of the democracy rather than 
expressing mere discontentment with the quality of services delivered. Similarly, in his 
analysis of media portrayals of community protests, Friedman (2019) argues that the 
notion of service delivery protests is “deeply undemocratic”. He argues that this narrow 
conception of protest action rests on the assumption that citizens are passive 
recipients of services delivered by government (Friedman, 2019), arguably restraining 
the voice, knowledge and insight capacities that citizens have over their own needs.  
Similarly, Mottiar’s (2014) case study, conducted with residents from Cato 
Manor, Merebank and Wentworth situated in Durban, provides empirical evidence that 
supports the views expressed by Alexander and colleagues (2018) and Friedman 
(2019). Mottiar’s evidence reveals that citizens’ understanding and motivations for 
engaging in community protest action transcend narrow concerns about the lack of 
service delivery. Her findings show that motivations for participating in community 
protest action are also entangled with citizen concerns about feeling “ignored and 
“disrespected” by the ruling ANC (Mottiar, 2014:380). Having clarified why this 
dissertation favours the concept ‘community’ protest over that of a ‘service delivery’ 
protest, the discussion now turns to examining debates about the frequency and scale 
of such protests in the country.  
 
2.3 Unpacking the frequency and scale of community protests 
 
Scholars are divided about the frequency and scale of community protests in the 
country. To this end, the frequency of community protest events in the country is 
entangled in debates that question the reliability of the publicly available data. This is 
probably a legitimate concern, as such data may hold implications for policy planning 
and government response interventions. According to L.Lancaster (2016) and Duncan 
(2016), measuring the actual extent and scale of community protests is a highly 
complex task, and in South Africa the South African Police Service (SAPS) Incident 
Registration Information System (IRIS) is one of the main information systems in which 
crowd incidents are recorded. The key concern for L.Lancaster (2016:3) is that the 
data captured in this system is often unreliable as recorded incidents do not go through 





In the same vein, Duncan (2014) also expresses concern about the reliability 
of the data recorded by private organisations such as Municipal IQ, particularly 
because the organisation solely relies on media reported incidences of protest action.  
Nevertheless, data collected by Municipal IQ shows that in 2012 a total of 173 public 
protests occurred, while in 2013 this figure totalled to 155, and in 2014 a total of 191 
and in 2015 a total of 164 incidents occurred respectively (L.Lancaster, 2016:7). Data 
gathered by the SAPS showed an increase in both peaceful and unrest-related 
incidents, from 7 409 to 12 399 between 2001 and 2013 (Marks and Bruce, 2015:209). 
In 2001 only 569 unrest-related gatherings were recorded; in 2008 this figure rose to 
705, while by 2013 the total number of unrest-related protests amounted to 1 882 
(Marks and Bruce, 2015:209). However, this data should be treated with caution, as 
Alexander, Runciman and Maruping (2016) argue that there has been a tendency to 
conflate the information on crowd incidents contained in the IRIS system with that of 
protests, both in research and media analysis.  
Although there is no consensus on the actual number of protests in South 
Africa, the Centre for Social Change (CSC), based at the University of Johannesburg 
(UJ), had access to the SAPS IRIS that contained information about 156 230 incidents 
recorded in the system between 1997 and 2013, next to a separate database 
recording protest event data based on media-reported instances (Alexander et al., 
2018). Here, they used a three-way categorisation of protest along a continuum of 
orderly, disruptive and violent protests as such an approach enables a more nuanced 
understanding of the phenomenon. Conceptually, Alexander and her colleagues 
(2018:31) define ‘orderly’ as being “tolerated by the authorities and often negotiated 
in advance. They include pickets, marches and public meetings”, while ‘disruptive’ is 
constructed as “identified by tactics such as blocking a road, commonly achieved by 
placing rocks/or burning tyres”, and ‘violent’ presents a situation “marked by evidence 
of violence” (Alexander et al., 2018:31).  This three-way categorisation of community 
protests was applied to a “large random sample” of the IRIS and media-collected data 
on protest events (Alexander et al., 2018:31). Their findings reveal that between 2005 
and 2017 community protests in the country peaked with a total of 471 protests on 
average in 2012, after which the frequency of protests levelled off, with about 370 





number of protests taking place in the country, almost all the available evidence (see 
Figure 1 below) shows that protest action, including community protests, is increasing.  
 
Figure 1: Protests recorded by Centre for Social Change (CSC) (2005-2017), Municipal 
IQ (MunIQ) (2005-2016), ACLED (community protests only) (2005-2017) and Community 
Protests Barometer (CPB) (2005-2018) 
 
(Source: Alexander et al., 2018:36) 
 
2.4 Analysing the drivers of community protests  
 
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate why communities often communicate 
their grievances through protest action. Therefore, this section analyses some of the 
key contributory factors associated with the predominance of community protests 
across the country. The first section considers structural factors such as inequality, 
poverty and the prevalence of unemployment and how these intersect with community 
protest action. In the second section I analyse the growing infusion of the African 
National Congress (ANC) into the state machinery and the influence of political 
factionalism as additional contributory factors to the rising levels of community protest 






2.4.1 Inequality, poverty and unemployment 
  
The available body of evidence that examines why communities resort to protest 
action reveals a diverse set of triggers. Several researchers share the view that at the 
heart of the discontent across South African communities is the growing prevalence 
and magnitude of inequality, poverty and unemployment (Alexander, 2010; Manyaka, 
2018; Von Holdt et al., 2011). The results of many studies suggest positive correlations 
between poverty, inequality and unemployment and the prevalence of community 
protests (Breakfast, Bradshaw and Nomarwayi, 2019; Delaney, 2016; Manyaka, 2018; 
Ntsala and Mahlatji, 2016; Ntswera and Kgalane, 2014). To a certain degree, this 
seems self-explanatory, especially since many community protests occur in 
communities where the incidence of poverty is prevalent. Poverty is also often ranked 
as a grievance in qualitative narrative accounts of communities that have protested 
(Von Holdt et al., 2011). 
Next to the pervasiveness of poverty in South Africa, is the intractable problem 
of inequality, leading several researchers and commentators to conclude that the 
country is amongst the most unequal societies globally (Keeton, 2014; Scott, 2019). 
For Alexander (2010), income inequality is one of the leading ‘structural’ drivers of 
community protests in the country. Since Alexander’s initial analysis, inequality has 
continued to expand, as has the frequency of community protests. Several studies 
highlight that community protests often involve demands for access to public services, 
which emanate from unequal access (Breakfast, Bradshaw and Nomarwayi, 2019; 
Manyaka, 2018; Mottiar, 2014; Ntswera and Kgalane, 2014; Wasserman, Chuma and 
Bosch, 2018). Therefore, it could be argued that a highly uneven distribution in income 
potential, compounded by unequal access to opportunities to improve living 
conditions, serve as important predictors of whether a community will resort to protest 
action or not.  
Parallel to this, unemployment is another prominent factor contributing to the 
manifestation of community protests (Alexander, 2010; Von Holdt et al., 2011). In 
2017, approximately 9.3 million citizens were unemployed, of which about 6 million 
consisted of people under the age of 35 years (Pepper, 2018:1). This implies that a 
significant number of young people in the country are excluded from the economy. 





often at the forefront of community protests. Paret and Runciman (2016:303) argue 
that in the context of South Africa’s steep unemployment rates and low-wage labour, 
a significant number of citizens are subjected to insecure livelihoods. This often 
renders them vulnerable to experiencing interrupted access to services. For example, 
the research conducted by Von Holdt and his colleagues (2011:46) in Kungcatsha 
supports this argument, given that protest action in this community emanated from the 
implementation of a “credit control policy” which compelled community members to 
pay for services. High incidences of unemployment seemingly place marginalised 
communities in a complex position, where on the one hand they are compelled to pay 
for certain services, while on the other, they are unable to afford access because of a 
lack of spending power. This, coupled with poverty and increasing levels of inequality, 
provides fertile grounds for the expression of discontentment and frustration through 
community protest action.  
 
2.4.2 ANC party-infused state and political factionalism 
 
The impact of political factionalism on state management has received growing 
scholarly attention in post-apartheid South Africa. Most of the existing scholarly work 
addresses how this phenomenon plays out within the ANC (Booysen, 2011; Dawson, 
2014; Mukwedeya, 2015; Twala, 2014; Von Holdt et al., 2011). This is possibly due to 
the ANC’s uninterrupted control of the national state machinery where most of the 
resource allocation and distribution power is located. Yet, it is important to note that 
factionalism is not exclusively characteristic of the ANC. For example, the resignation 
of the former leader of the Democratic Alliance (DA) Mr Musi Maimane in 2019 aptly 
demonstrates this point. Following his resignation from the DA, Mr Maimane publicly 
noted that he parted ways with the party due to an internal smear campaign from 
factions within the DA that sought to undermine both his leadership as well as his 
efforts to transform the party (Madisa, 2019). 
 However, Booysen (2015) illustrates that any analysis of the contemporary 
state should account for factionalism within the ANC, particularly because it has 
become increasingly difficult to discern the distinction between party and state over 
the past few years. Booysen's analysis recognises that factionalism is not necessarily 





from the character of the ANC’s factional battles is that its harmful repercussions 
frequently seep into the machinery of the state. These, in turn, have harmful 
consequences for effective bureaucratic management of public institutions (Booysen, 
2015:29). The spillover effects of internal party factionalism find their way into public 
institutions through the appointment of pliable individuals with dubious 'professional 
and personal records' to strategic positions in government (Booysen, 2015:29). The 
resources of the state security services are used to resolve internal factional disputes 
and the ANC then has the ability to insert itself into strategic state decision-making 
processes (Booysen, 2015:29-30). For example, regarding former President Jacob 
Zuma's ascent into power as the president of the state and party, Booysen (2011:38) 
points out that the “Mbeki-Zuma transitional war” took root within the public sector 
across the different spheres of the state. The effects of this shift in presidential power 
were fraught with instability that resulted in “paralysis, delays, procrastination and non-
implementation” of decisions and policies (Booysen, 2011:38).  This demonstrates 
how discord within the ranks of the ANC as a political party has a formative influence 
on the stability of the ANC-led government (Booysen, 2011:38). 
 While Booysen (2015) offers a macro analysis of ANC factionalism by primarily 
examining its impact from a national governmental perspective, in contrast, 
Mukwedeya's (2015) research offers insights about how this phenomenon plays out 
at the micro, or local government, level. According to Mukwedeya (2015:125-126), 
factionalism in the ANC at the municipal level often centres around intraparty 
contestation for access to resources and opportunities that come with managing local 
government institutions. This thesis is supported by the findings of several studies that 
explore ANC factionalism at the municipal level as a contributory factor to the 
predominance of localised community protests.   
For instance, Booysen (2011:150) reveals a plausible link between ANC 
factionalism and community protests. She notes that this trend was particularly evident 
in the lead up to and aftermath of the 2011 local government elections. Her research 
findings highlight that intra-ANC contestation among party members for positions in 
local government structures are often expressed alongside the grievances raised 
through community protests. This is primarily a result of the imposition of political 
candidates by regional and provincial structures over community-preferred candidates 





formations within the ANC branches to use weak service delivery and governance to 
“mobilize against local opponents” (Twala 2014:163).  
The effects of this development arguably undermine the stability of 
municipalities, because such contestation has the potential to thwart the ability of 
municipal councils from passing decisions and to effectively exercise their resource 
allocation functions. This, in turn, may spill over into the administrative domain of 
municipal management with potentially deleterious consequences for service delivery 
to communities, which may further perpetuate the proliferation of protests. For 
example, Olver’s (2018) research conducted in the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
Municipality demonstrates how the instability arising from factional political battles 
erodes the administrative capacity of municipalities. He argues that the erosion of 
administrative capacity resulted in “chronic” under-performance of the municipality 
that, in turn, triggered community protests in the city (Olver, 2018:285). 
Furthermore, Von Holdt and colleagues (2011) posit that internal political 
contestation within the ANC can partially be linked to the growing dysfunctionality 
characterising municipalities and the prevalence of community protests. The findings 
of their case study conducted in Voortrekker in Mpumalanga province highlight that 
political rivalry and power struggles, due to factionalism, often revolved around access 
to resources and power over local government structures (Von Holdt et al., 2011:42). 
They made similar observations in a different community, Kungcatsha, in the same 
province. In this case, their analysis brought into view that intense contestation 
between councillors, the mayor and the speaker were often at the centre of municipal 
service-related community protests that beset the community in 2009. In their view, 
contestation for these municipal positions was particularly rife as they enable 
individuals who occupy them to provide their support base with “preferential access to 
jobs and business opportunities” (Von Holdt et al., 2011:54). Personal wealth 
accumulation for political representatives is often the driving force behind factional 
battles (Von Holdt et al., 2011). Thus, it is possible to infer that this trend holds adverse 
consequences for the capacity of municipalities to supply communities with stable 
access to basic services. 
Beyond personal wealth accumulation, political factionalism sometimes also 
produces enabling conditions under which political representatives can extend 





political opponents” (Isandla Institute, 2011:6). Understandably, this could cause 
discord in contexts where communities and different political formations experience 
and observe conspicuously unequal access to and distribution of resources. For 
instance, Kgatle (2017) suggests that this form of political favouritism is also one of 
the contributory causal factors of the wave of protests that the country has experienced 
since democratisation. Regarding the 2016 community protests in the CTMM, Kgatle 
(2017) illustrates that the formations within the ANC that protested in opposition to 
Thoko Didiza’s mayoral candidacy did so on the basis that her election could destroy 
their access to resources and mayoral committee positions in the municipality.  
In contrast, Dawson’s (2014) findings from a case study conducted in an 
informal settlement in Zandspruit points out that the process of seeking political 
favours from the local state could also manifest as a bottom-up process. In this way 
communities engage in protest to “build up paternalistic and personal relations with 
the state” to negotiate access to resources and opportunities (Dawson, 2014:538). 
This finding thus shows how communities could capitalise on the existence of ANC 
factional formations within the municipality to leverage access to lucrative municipal 
resources (Dawson, 2014). 
This discussion has highlighted the influence of political factionalism, 
particularly in the ANC, as an entry point to understanding how this phenomenon 
influences bureaucratic management of state institutions. It has also shown how and 
why internal political party factional contestation finds its way to the centre of 
community protests, as well as how communities may at times use party-based 
political disputes to gain access to resources. Apart from these contributory triggers of 
community protests, an assessment of municipal responses to community protests 
also requires an analysis of municipalities in their appropriate context in the South 
African political system. The structural composition of municipal institutions and the 
broader systemic environment in which they are located could further help us 
understand why communities resort to protest action, while at the same time providing 
tentative insights as to how this environment might shape municipal responses to 
community protests. Therefore, the next chapter explores the South African approach 








This chapter offered a citizen-centred perspective of community protests in democratic 
South Africa in attempt to locate the study in the broader the intellectual debates about 
community protests. This chapter specifically highlighted how community protests in 
the country grew substantially despite the lack of consensus about specific numbers. 
It also demonstrated that growing protest activity should be understood within the 
context of rising inequality, poverty, unemployment and the growing infusion of the 
ANC into structures of the state – thereby conflating party-state relations. In the next 








































Chapter Three: Reviewing South Africa’s local governance system 
 
 
This chapter is part two of the literature review. It evaluates the implementation of 
decentralised municipal governance as an attempt to situate municipalities in their 
appropriate place within the multi-level government system adopted in 1994. Particular 
emphasises is placed on demonstrating how the structural environment in which 
municipalities are situated could compound community protests and affect municipal 
responses to it. Next, the chapter demonstrates how the different spheres of 
government are interconnected through a system of cooperative governance and 
intergovernmental relations. This is followed by a discussion of participatory municipal 
governance as a key feature of the post-apartheid model of decentralisation adopted 
in the country. Alongside this, the chapter also analyses fiscal decentralisation and its 
intersections with community protests in South Africa. From here, the chapter 
proceeds to analyse how scholars have previously addressed the question of 
municipal responses to community protests. Here, the chapter specifically sheds light 
on securitised government responses as the main body of relevant scholarship. 
Finally, the chapter shows the gap in the available body of scholarship and how this 
dissertation contributes to addressing this void. 
 
3.1 The path to decentralised governance in South Africa 
 
Decentralisation has become ubiquitous in many democratic contexts and is often 
advanced as the panacea to address the democratic deficit in countries of the global 
South. Since the concept first attracted the attention of policymakers during the 1950s 
and 1960s (Work, 2002:5), there has been extensive research into the efficacy of the 
implementation of decentralisation in different development contexts (see Awortwi, 
2010; Bardhan, 2002; Bland, 2011; Couttolenc, 2012). Similarly, there is an expansive 
body of literature that have debated the conceptual boundaries of decentralisation 
(see Ahmad, Devarajan, Khemani and Shah, 2005; Boko, 2002; Crawford and 
Hartmann, 2008; Diaz-Serrano and Rodríguez-Pose, 2015; Dubois and Fattore, 2009; 
Krishnamohan, 2015; Nzimakwe and Pillay, 2014; and Ribot, 2002). Most importantly, 
these scholars agree that at its core, decentralisation is a process that involves the 





government. Due to the limitations of this dissertation, I am unable to discuss these 
debates in depth. Instead, I focus the discussion on the nuances of the South African 
approach to decentralisation as these are most relevant to the findings presented later 
in this dissertation. 
Following the negotiations for a constitutional political system, the country 
implemented a three-tiered decentralised system of government. The new system 
established a national, provincial and local level of government that is “distinctive, 
interdependent and interrelated” (Republic of South Africa (RSA), 1996); each having 
their own set of functions and responsibilities. While these levels of government have 
distinctive powers and functions, it is important to note that the Constitution also 
envisages a degree of cooperation between them - an issue I return to in the next 
section. 
The Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) (2003:15) 
summarises the responsibilities and functions of the national level of government as 
that of “policy formulation and making, developing national standards, and rules and 
regulations”. To this end, Feinstein (2015:1) highlights that the national government 
specifically executes these functions in relation to “macroeconomic policy, foreign 
affairs, trade, mining, justice, social benefits, public enterprises, defence, education, 
housing and infrastructure”. In contrast, the provincial level of government has the 
power to formulate and implement provincial laws relating to “tourism and share 
responsibility with national government for health, education housing, transport, 
agriculture and policing” (Feinstein, 2015:1). However, local government possesses 
powers to manage local governmental affairs in terms of section (3) of 151 of the 
Constitution. Local government is further responsible for inculcating democratic and 
accountable municipal governance, ensuring the provision of sustainable services to 
communities to promote social and economic development, to create safe and healthy 
environments, and to foster community participation in local affairs (RSA, 1996).  
In line with these objectives, South African municipalities, which constitute local 
government, occupy a central position in the democratic project of building local 
governance institutions that are inclusive, representative and responsive to the needs 
of the communities they serve. To give effect to this vision, subsection 151 of the 
Constitution makes legal provision for the establishment of a local sphere of 





Councils (RSA, 1996). This section of the Constitution further confers a considerable 
degree of autonomy to municipalities, given that it endows them with powers to govern 
the localities they serve “on its own initiative”, while at the same time limiting 
interference by the national and provincial levels of government into how municipalities 
“exercise its powers or perform its functions” (RSA 1996). These constitutional 
provisions form the legal basis for the existence of municipalities and enable them to 
co-determine and co-craft local development agendas with communities. 
Structurally, the local government of the country is composed of 278 
municipalities of which 8 are metropolitan, 44 district and a further 226 local 
municipalities (South Africa Yearbook, 2017/18:10). Section 155 of the Constitution 
mandates these distinctions as it makes provision for the establishment of Category 
A; Category B and Category C municipalities. Parallel to this Constitutional provision, 
the Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 legislates that a Category A municipality can 
only be established in an extended urban area that possesses a combination of the 
features, including a high concentration of people; concentrated business and 
industrial activities; an elaborate and diverse economy and an area in need of 
integrated planning, amongst others (RSA, 1998).  
Municipalities within this category are endowed with “exclusive municipal 
executive and legislative authority in their areas” (Van der Walt 2015:8). This implies 
that metropolitan municipalities have full discretionary powers to administer and 
implement policies for the localities over which they govern. In this regard, section 153 
unequivocally confers municipalities with the responsibility to prioritise the needs of 
local communities in their administrative, planning and budgeting processes. In 
respect of Category B Municipalities (also known as local municipalities) section 83 
(1) of the Municipal Structures Act highlights that their power and functions are vested 
in section 156 and 229 of the Constitution. To this end, section 156 of the Constitution 
confers local municipalities with executive authority over “electricity and gas 
reticulation, firefighting services, local tourism, municipal airports, municipal planning,  
municipal health services, municipal public transport…trading regulations, water and 
sanitation services”, “air pollution”, “building regulations”, “municipal public works” and 
“storm water management systems” covered in part B of Schedule 4 of the 





municipalities powers to collect revenue through the imposition of rates on property 
and services rendered to communities.  
In contrast, Category C or district municipalities are responsible for establishing 
an integrated, sustainable and equitable socio-economic development for the area 
over which they govern (RSA, 1998). The district municipality is set to realise these 
objectives through facilitating integrated development planning, encouraging 
infrastructural development and the provision of services, expanding and supporting 
the ‘capacity’ of local municipalities that fall within its area of jurisdiction to fulfil their 
constitutional mandate, and to advance a more just distribution of resources between 
local municipalities.  
 Section 84 (1) of the Municipal Structures Act further maintains that district 
municipalities have powers over integrated development for the district municipality, 
electricity provision, regulation of local public transport systems, provision of local 
health services and stimulating local tourism, amongst a host of other local matters 
(RSA, 1998). Despite the differences in powers and functions across the categories of 
municipalities, they are all responsible for realising the objectives outlined in terms of 
sub-section 151 and 152 of the Constitution addressed earlier.  
The adoption of decentralised models of governance is most often associated 
with neoliberal democratic practices, to the extent that it relates to notions such as 
enhanced transparency, improved accountability, citizen participation, enhanced 
service delivery and government responsiveness. However, scholars such as 
Friedman and Kihato (2004) and Koelble and Siddle (2012) argue that these 
motivations were not necessarily the driving force behind the adoption of 
decentralisation in South Africa. In fact, Friedman and Kihato (2004:159) locate the 
implementation of the post-apartheid model of decentralised governance within the 
framework of the negotiations to end apartheid during the 1990s. These scholars 
assert that the negotiations for the current multilevel-government model took place in 
a political space in which key negotiating stakeholders disagreed about the design of 
the system. This lack of agreement was to a large extent informed by the fact that the 
key political parties negotiating for a constitutional order all held mismatched visions 
about which government system would be best suited to rebuild a society left deeply 
damaged and unequal by apartheid rule (Friedman and Kihato, 2004; Koelble and 





For example, the ANC advocated the establishment of a unitary state, as the 
party’s leadership expressed concern that the devolution of power to subnational 
levels of government would keep the racial and ethnic enclaves established through 
separate development policies firmly intact. At the same time, this would enable white 
communities to “escape the consequences of majority rule” (Friedman and Kihato, 
2004:153). The ANC’s fears were to some extent defensible as Haysom (cited in 
Schwella, 2016:73) argues that stakeholders who supported the push towards 
maximal devolution of power and autonomy to provincial administrations, in some 
sense yearned to retain features of the fragmented apartheid government system.  
As a case in point, Murray and Simeon (2011:1) show that some sections in the 
then Nationalist Party (NP) were concerned that the ANC’s preoccupation with the 
idea of a unitary state at the time of negotiations would eliminate the possibility of the 
formation of an “Afrikaans province or homeland” in the new South Africa; hence, their 
insistence on the formation of a decentralised model. The Inkhata Freedom Party (IFP) 
insisted that it would only agree to a governance system in which there was space for 
political self-determination in KwaZulu-Natal province (Tepeciklioglu, 2018:166); 
arguably wanting to retain elements of the system of separate development brought 
about by the homeland system. However, Tepeciklioglu (2018) points out the leader 
of the IFP, Mr. Mangosuthu Buthelezi, rejected the claim that the party was interested 
in separate development. Instead, the party was of the view that solving South Africa’s 
divided history could only occur through the implementation of a federalist governance 
model to satisfy the multiplicity of interests and demands.  
This discussion has highlighted that neo-liberal motivations did not necessarily 
underpin the adoption of the decentralised model of governance in post-apartheid 
South Africa, but was rather the outcome of satisfying the competing political 
aspirations and demands of the key stakeholders involved in the constitutional 
negotiations. An outline of the structural design of the country’s three-tiered 
governance model has also been provided. The next section situates municipalities in 
the system of co-operative governance and intergovernmental relations, which is 
mainly an outcome of the model of decentralisation adopted at the dawn of democracy 







3.2 Municipalities in the system of co-operative governance and 
intergovernmental relations 
 
The previous section highlighted how the South African state is fragmented into three 
distinct, interrelated and mutually dependent spheres of government that are largely 
an outcome of the model of decentralisation adopted following the negotiations for a 
democratic country. Thus, the purpose of this section is to demonstrate how these 
different spheres of government are related and interact through intergovernmental 
relations.  
It is important to first briefly explain the concepts of co-operative governance 
and intergovernmental relations (IGR), as these are related yet distinct notions. Malan 
(2005:2) describes co-operative governance as a philosophy that centralises the 
formation of partnerships across different spheres of government, based on a shared 
understanding and acceptance of the founding values of the state. In contrast, 
Philimore (2013:229) defines IGR as “the processes and institutions through which 
governments within a political system interact”. Malan (2005:228) highlights that the 
IGR processes described by Philimore are primarily concerned with the fiscal and 
administrative procedures related to the conditional transfer of revenue and resources 
between the different spheres of government. As such, it becomes clear that co-
operative governance provides the framework in which IGR ought to take place. 
In South Africa, section 41 of the Constitution lays the foundation of this 
framework. It prescribes the eight core principles aimed at inculcating a culture and 
spirit of cooperative governance to assist all spheres of government in achieving their 
intended Constitutional mandates and developmental objectives. These principles 
include, that all levels of government must protect peace, harmony and cohesion in 
the state; actively promote the well-being of citizens; perform their functions in an 
effective, transparent and accountable manner; be loyal to the Constitution; respect 
the autonomy and powers of other spheres of government; avoid usurping the powers 
of other levels of government; exercise their powers in a manner that does not 
“encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of government in 
another sphere” and must co-operate with one another in “mutual trust and good faith” 
(RSA, 1996). 
Collectively, these principles emphasise that all three spheres of government 





sovereignty of the state, to protect all citizens and to manage all resources effectively. 
Furthermore, these principles also emphasise that no individual sphere enjoys 
superiority over the other, but rather that they are mutually dependent. Because these 
principles are merely values that should guide intergovernmental actions, section 42 
(2) of the Constitution further makes it incumbent on Parliament to: 
 
a) establish or provide for structures and institutions to promote 
and facilitate intergovernmental relations; and 
b) provide for appropriate mechanisms and procedures to 
facilitate settlement of intergovernmental disputes (RSA, 1996: 
Section 42 (2)). 
 
To give effect to these two constitutional provisions, the South African Parliament 
implemented the Intergovernmental Relations Framework (IRF) Act of 2005 and the 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act (FRA) of 1997 (Tau, 2015).  The IRF of 2005 
thus provides the regulatory framework that governs IGR in the country and the 
mechanisms and procedures that govern intergovernmental disputes. This Act 
enables the establishment of various participatory intergovernmental forums such as 
the President's Coordinating Council, National Intergovernmental Forum (NIF), 
Provincial Intergovernmental Forum (PIF) and the Municipal Intergovernmental Forum 
(MIF) (IRF, 2005; Tau, 2015). The establishment of these participatory forums is to 
enable the relevant stakeholders from the different spheres to deliberate issues of 
mutual interest including, amongst others, policy development and implementation, 
service provisioning and addressing governance shortcomings in the different spheres 
of government (RSA, 2005). 
In contrast, the purpose of the FRA of 1997 aims at developing co-operative 
relations between the three spheres of government on matters related to fiscal, 
budgetary and financial management practices. It also prescribes the relevant 
procedural processes for determining equitable sharing and allocation of revenue 
collected nationally by the state (RSA, 1997). Here, section 227 of the Constitution 
establishes a financial relationship between national, provincial and local government 
in that it instructs the national government to allocate an equitable share of revenue 
raised nationally to municipalities to enable them to discharge their developmental 





conditional or unconditional revenue allocations (RSA, 1996). The FRA also provides 
for the establishment of consultative intergovernmental fiscal forums such as the 
Budget Council, the Local Government Budget Forum, where relevant stakeholders 
can engage on matters relating to financial and budget matters, policy and legislative 
changes and matters relating to the monitoring of municipal financial management 
practices, amongst others (RSA, 1997).  
From this discussion it is clear that while municipalities enjoy considerable 
autonomy to govern on their own accord, they are also located in a complex network 
in which they interact with other spheres of government to perform their functions 
effectively. At the same time, it also shows how municipalities feature in the overall 
structure of the state and how they cooperate with other levels of government in 
pursuance of accountable and transparent use and management of public resources 
for the collective good of society. However, because community protests in South 
Africa often involve demands around access to services that are shared functions 
across the spheres of government – such as housing, for example - a broader 
discussion of the efficacy of intergovernmental relations is necessary. A reflection on 
IGR is also necessary because municipalities are situated within a governmental 
dispensation that requires them to work collaboratively with other spheres of 
government for efficient service delivery and to contribute to the broader 
developmental agenda of the state. While there are many challenges in IGR, this 
discussion only focuses on the main issues relevant to the research questions. On this 
basis, this section addresses aspects of the uncertainty related to the responsibilities 
of the different spheres of government, intergovernmental coordination, tension within 
the set of intergovernmental relations and the issue of unfunded municipal mandates. 
Coetzee (2010) and Koelble and Siddle (2012) bring to our attention that IGR 
in the country's multi-level government system is characterised by a considerable 
degree of uncertainty about the responsibilities of government departments across the 
different spheres particularly in instances where different spheres have concurrent 
responsibility for certain functions. The challenge arising out of such uncertainty is that 
it holds implications for determining which level of government should assume 
accountability when failures in the delivery of services occur (Coetzee, 2010; Steytler, 
2005). This problem is likely to transpire under conditions of ineffective coordination 





(Malan, 2005:238). As such, coordination presumably assists the alignment of 
functions and activities of different departments located in different spheres without 
any duplication of such functions and uncertainty about responsibilities. Ile (2010:56) 
supports this inference by arguing that the lack of coordination between the different 
spheres lies at the centre of growing citizen frustration with the speed at which 
government delivers services across the country. Recent empirical case evidence 
from a study conducted in Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality by Mangwanya (2019) 
supports these theoretical inferences. In this study, Mangwanya found that the 
municipality experienced a breakdown in service delivery to communities due to the 
lack of clarity around intergovernmental structures and the weak sense of coordination 
between the different spheres of government. 
Furthermore, Tau (2015) argues that there are growing signs of tension within 
intergovernmental relations in South Africa, as evidenced by the increasing level of 
litigation between the different spheres of government. For example, Tau (2015:819) 
demonstrates how the decision of the Premier of the Western Cape to dissolve the 
Council of the Overberg District Municipality because it failed to pass a budget in 2010 
constituted an overreach of power to intervene in the affairs of the municipality. Koelble 
and Siddle (2012) suggest that the challenge described by Tau can also be analysed 
in the context of the reluctant devolution of power to sub-national levels of government. 
This overreach of power could be symptomatic of the “ever present jealousy of national 
government over its powers” which they then try to regain through diminishing the 
power of lower levels of government (Koelble and Siddle 2012:50). 
Earlier, this chapter addressed Booysen’s (2011) and Matebesi’s (2017) 
concern about misdirected protest demands levelled against municipalities that have 
their roots in the failures of other spheres of government. This concern requires a 
consideration in the context of the challenges of intergovernmental relations. Here, 
Steytler's (2005) critique of concurrent competencies is particularly useful, even 
though he does not directly address this problem in relation to community protests. 
For Steytler (2005:278-297), apart from the adverse impacts concurrent functions 
could hold for accountability and the effectiveness of service delivery, it creates 
conditions whereby municipalities could end up being solely responsible for functions 





spheres of government to evade accountability for failures in the delivery of shared 
competencies (Steytler, 2005:279). 
Additionally, the side effects of uncertainty about responsibility around shared 
competencies also connects to the challenge of “unfunded mandates” (Steytler and 
Fessha 2007:324). According to Steytler and Fessha (2007), in principle, unfunded 
mandates refer to instances in which municipalities provide services that do not fall 
within the scope of their competencies. The implication of this is that failures in the 
delivery of such services are probable because municipalities do not necessarily 
receive funds to provide such services. Thus, there is scope for unfunded mandates 
to  “eat into local resources” that are critical to the delivery of the legally mandated 
competencies of municipalities (Mbazira, 2013:262). Given the widely documented 
links between community protests and the failures of local government service 
delivery, there is a chance unfunded mandates are a possible contributory source of 
such protests. 
Overall, this section has shown that municipalities are situated in a complex 
network of intergovernmental relations that shape their ability to perform their functions 
competently. It has further highlighted that governance challenges associated with 
intergovernmental relations, under certain conditions, may result in municipal service 
delivery failures that are beyond their control. This, in turn, may trigger protests at the 
local level, which municipalities might not necessarily have the capacity to respond to. 
The focus of this chapter now turns to assessing participatory municipal governance 
as a key feature of the model of decentralisation the country implemented.  
 
3.3 Decentralisation and participatory municipal governance 
 
Participatory governance is a key feature of the decentralised governance system that 
South Africa adopted. Most of the development literature shows that the practice of 
participatory governance has become commonplace in most democratic contexts and 
is assumed to relieve exclusion, poor citizen-state relations and decision-making 
about resources that are not reflective of the ideals and needs of citizens. However, 
participatory governance has been subject to intellectual contestation by scholars 
since the early 1960s, resulting in different typologies of participation. Initially, scholars 





governance is perhaps the oldest strand of participatory thinking in the literature, given 
its historical connection to pluralist democracy (Steifel and Wolfe, 2011:20). From this 
perspective, it was assumed that participation possesses the propensity to stimulate 
and entrench “‘free competition in ideas and criticisms; protection of the rights of 
minorities; two-way communication between citizens and their elected leaders” (Steifel 
and Wolfe, 2011:20). 
By the 1980s participatory democratic thought slipped out of popularity in policy 
discourse in the global North, while it gained traction in the global South under a new 
framework labelled participatory development (Altschuler and Corrales, 2013:10). This 
meant that there was a growing focus on integrating participation into projects and 
programmes. De Beer brings this theoretical shift into sharp focus with his description 
of the concept:  
 
Participation does not mean passive involvement in something (a 
project) planned and led by outsiders. When people are mobilised to 
participate, they should do so fully, and get involved in all aspects of 
the project. (De Beer, 2012:109) 
 
This deliberate linking of participation to projects and programmes in participatory 
development discourse is arguably linked to the fact that development at the time was 
conceptualised as the sum-total of ‘development projects’ rather than an intricate 
societal process affecting transformative social change (Steifel and Wolfe, 2011:23). 
By the 1990s participatory development became increasingly subject to 
critique; thus, stimulating a new wave of scholarship on participatory governance 
(Altschuler and Corrales, 2013:11-12). This new body of scholarship, while retaining 
links to earlier writings on participation, placed more emphasis on citizen participation 
and the redesign of government institutions to eliminate “elite capture, preference 
imposition, citizen overburdening, and passive submission to the status quo” that was 
characteristic of previous conceptions of participation (Altschuler and Corrales, 
2013:13). This strand of participatory governance thus seeks to counterbalance the 
failures of representative democracy, through the implementation of state-created 
institutional spaces that allow for the inclusion of citizens’ voices and preferences 





Even though the adoption of participatory governance in South Africa in some 
ways finds resonance with the motivations outlined above, it is also crucial to account 
for the ways in which local conditions shaped the current character and structure of 
participatory governance in the country. Here, Brooks (2017:108) argues that the 
character of contemporary participatory democratic practices in the country is 
connected to its historic experience with community structures that emerged from the 
mass civic opposition to apartheid rule and the ANC’s conception of participatory 
democracy. Historically, the civic movement, in collaboration with the United 
Democratic Front (UDF), formed popular community-based structures in communities 
inhabited by people of colour during the apartheid era (Brooks, 2017:108). Buhlungu 
(2005) cites the formation of street committees and people’s courts as practical 
examples through which community participation in local affairs was enabled. For 
example, street committees were composed of residents from specific 
neighbourhoods from which the committees would then elect representatives to 
advance the interests of the neighbourhood at a “township-wide level” (Buhlungu, 
2005:44). According to Brooks (2017), these community structures to some degree 
represented a vision of a participatory democratic future, as they functioned as a mode 
of communal self-governance and ensured that communities had access to welfare 
services which the apartheid state intentionally refused to provide to township areas. 
It is against this backdrop that the democratic ideas that underpinned the formation of 
these community structures found their way into the policy deliberations of the new 
local government system adopted in post-apartheid South Africa – as many of the 
activists from the civic movement also formed part of this process (Brooks, 2017).  
Thus, the development of institutionalised participatory governance is in part an 
outcome of a seeming insistence within the ranks of the ANC for the party to maintain 
its liberation heritage of being a mass movement. This finds expression through the 
ANC’s commitment to centralising the idea of popular participation in governance 
practices in contemporary South Africa and the party’s long-held view that democracy 
is more than elections (Brooks, 2017:113). However, at the same time, Brooks further 
points out that the ANC shares its mass movement status with the support from the 
civic structures that arose from the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) against 
apartheid. This is because trade unions and civic movements also played a decisive 





this, the ANC have further managed to maintain control over its ability to “claim mass 
movement status” as it effectively co-opted substantial sections of the MDM when the 
country became a democracy (Brooks, 2017). This co-option of sections of the MDM 
has its roots sunk in the negotiations for a constitutional democratic system. For 
instance, Buhlungu (2005:58) argues that the negotiations concentrated the decision-
making powers about what South Africa’s democratic future would look like in the 
hands of the leaders of the ANC, trade unions and civic movements. This, in turn, 
resulted in the ‘demobilisation’ of communities and was instrumental in overthrowing 
the apartheid state (Buhlungu, 2005).  
Alongside these developments, Brooks (2017) notes that there has also been 
a growing inclination within the ANC to treat some civil society organisations with a 
certain degree of suspicion in democratic South Africa. This despite its continued 
insistence of being a mass movement with a vested interest in facilitating broad public 
participation in governance processes.  As such, this creates a certain degree of 
incongruence in the party’s policy commitment to public participation and its broader 
public political discourse (Brooks, 2017). It is thus this lack of harmony in the ANC’s 
ideological and public policy commitment to participatory democracy that in some 
sense finds its way to the centre of the ineffectiveness of participatory governance 
practices implemented since democratisation (Brooks, 2017). 
It is this set of local conditions which have influenced the current model of 
decentralised participatory local governance in important ways. With this backdrop in 
mind, South Africa has a broad legal regulatory framework that institutionalises 
community participation at the local government level. These institutional participatory 
mechanisms are referred to as invited spaces, enabled and led by the state to realise 
community involvement and deliberative and collective decision making about local 
concerns (Piper and Nadvi, 2010:213). 
The legislative context that guides invited spaces of participation is particularly 
informed by the Constitution of 1996. The adoption of the Constitution arguably acts 
as the cornerstone of participatory democracy, given its legal protection and 
commitment to community and civil society contributions to public life and political 
processes. These democratic and participatory ideals find expression in several 
sections and subsections of the Constitution. For instance, section 19 (1 and 3) 





representatives and to hold elected positions (RSA, 1996). Alongside this, section 59 
(1 and 2) tasks the National Assembly with the responsibility to facilitate public 
involvement and access to the core work of parliament (RSA, 1996). More importantly, 
section 152 (e) obligates local governments to encourage community involvement in 
the affairs of local government (RSA, 1996).  
Section 152 (e) is further supported by the Municipal Systems Act of 2000. 
Chapter 4 of this Act places community participation at the centre of local government. 
This legislative instrument specifically instructs municipalities to establish conditions 
conducive to community participation; to establish participatory structures, 
mechanisms and processes; to establish appropriate communication channels for 
participation and to provide “public notice of a meeting of municipal councils” to 
communities (RSA, 2000). The 1994-2014 Twenty Year South Africa Review 
background paper prepared by the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation 
(DPME) on democracy and citizenship shows that public participation and 
accountability mechanisms at the local government level are operationalised through 
structures such as community policing forums, clinic committees, school governing 
bodies, ward committees and Integrated Development Planning (IDP) consultative 
fora (DPME, 2014:16-20), some of which will be discussed below. 
One of the most important mechanisms through which communities can 
participate in the affairs of local government is through the election of representatives 
every five years. The election of councillors holds direct consequences for service 
delivery to communities, however, the importance of local government elections 
extends beyond the mere delivery of services. For instance, Lemon (2002:255) argues 
that this form of participation also enables the recognition of community voices in local 
governance. Similarly, the World Bank (2011:25) advises that the election of local 
representatives is instrumental in ensuring accountability at the local government level 
since local communities can directly elect their preferred candidates to represent them 
in the structures of local government. To give effect to these benefits, South Africa has 
adopted a mixed electoral system that combines proportional representation and a 
first-past-the-post approach (Hendrickse, Olivier and Venter, 2006:7). For Russon 
(2011:75), the strength of this system lies in its capacity to enable direct accountability, 
given that “it holds candidates directly accountable to the electorate, for, if they do not 





Furthermore, ward committees are an important mechanism that enables 
deepening democratic practice at the local government level. According to the 
Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA), ward 
committees serve as the “consultative body and communication channel” (COGTA, 
2020) of the municipal council and have the following functions: 
 
 representing the community on the compilation and 
implementation of the Integrated Development Plan; 
 ensuring constructive and harmonious interaction between the 
municipality and the community; 
 attending to all matters that affect and benefit the community; 
 acting in the best interest of the community, and 
 ensuring active participation of the community in the 
municipality's budgetary process. (COGTA, 2020) 
 
Cumulatively, these functions seek to establish closer relations between municipal 
structures and communities and to allow for the absorption of citizen voices into 
decision-making, to ensure that community needs are at the centre of the 
developmental agenda of local governments.  
Similarly, Integrated Development Planning (IDP) is a crucial element of 
developmental local government (De Visser, 2005; Binns and Nel, 2002). IDP assists 
municipalities in crafting a strategic vision for itself, in partnership with communities 
and other stakeholders, in respect of “planning, management and decision-making” 
(Valeta and Walton, 2008:375) of available resources at its disposal. This shows that 
IDP may serve as an important enabler for the prioritisation of community needs. 
Mafunisa and Xaba (2008:455) extend the role of IDP in local government by arguing 
that, at its core, IDP should foster a participatory governance culture that enables 
participation by “those who had been previously marginalised”. This implies that IDP 
indirectly also plays a transformational role when assessed against South Africa's 
grotesque history of experimentation with exclusion based on race and gender. Now 
that the discussion has clarified the structure and importance of some of the core 
participatory governance practices at the local government level, the focus of this 
section turns to evaluating the effectiveness of these participatory instruments in the 





Even though participatory decentralised municipal governance is frequently 
framed as a precursor to deepening local democracy, the poor implementation and 
operationalisation of participatory mechanisms for community participation in 
municipal affairs remains a challenge (Piper and Von Lieres, 2008). As a result, local 
government institutions are ineffective in responding to the needs and grievances of 
communities. This is despite their mandate as the sphere of government that in theory 
ought to be closest to the people to ameliorate the lingering legacy of apartheid and 
to reconstruct local development. In this regard, the argument that community protests 
are often used as a mechanism by those located on the periphery of society to secure 
the attention of the state and officials, advanced by Amtakia (2013), points to a 
plausible link between weak decentralised participatory governance structures and 
community protests.  
This inference is supported by several scholars. For instance, Jolobe (2014:1) 
argues that the wave of public protests which has beleaguered South Africa since 
2004 epitomises the “crises of the new local government regime”. He further notes 
that despite the shift in how the country’s democratic local municipalities function in 
comparison with municipal structures of the apartheid era, there is no radical break 
with the historic “top-down structures that have developed since Union” was formed 
(Jolobe, 2014:5). In addition, scholars such as Molepo, Maleka and Khalo (2015:365) 
and Mkhize (2015:191) show that some municipalities do not have concrete strategies 
to facilitate public participation in municipal processes. In instances where such 
strategies has been implemented, participatory processes tend to be unclear to 
communities. For Sinwell (2010:23-24), this development should be seen against the 
backdrop of the adoption of “technocratic and managerial” approaches to the 
operationalisation and implementation of participation in government affairs, 
inadvertently curtailing citizen-directed development. There is a mounting body of 
evidence that shows formal participatory governance practices in the country constrain 
citizen participation (Lemanski, 2017; Piper and von Lieres, 2008; Plessing, 2017; 
Williams, 2006). For example, Plessing (2017:73-74) and Sebola (2016:67) locate the 
failures of participatory governance within the politics that surround the theoretical 
construction of participation. In this regard, Plessing (2017:77) argues that 
international and government elites often merge disparate conceptions of participation 





Sebola (2016:67) supports this stance through arguing that public participation in 
policy processes in the country tend to dovetail the interests of the governing elite, 
instead of being rooted within the views and preferences of citizens. Here, the critique 
about the conceptual tension and contradictions in how the ruling ANC conceptualises 
participatory democracy, advanced by Brooks (2017), is particularly relevant. This is 
specifically because the governing party has substantial powers to influence the 
implementation of systems in practice. Thus, in instances where conceptual 
uncertainty about the underlying ideological assumptions of government systems 
exists, for example participatory governance spaces, the practical operationalisation 
of such systems is potentially more prone to failure.  
Furthermore, invited spaces, with reference to the ward committee system, 
have been subject to critique for their inability to provide neutral spaces for engaging 
issues affecting local communities because matters relating to political party affiliation 
often dominate the agenda of these spaces (Skenjana and Kimemia, 2011:57). The 
government admitted in its 20 Year Review on Democracy and Citizenship that this 
system is also challenged by “tensions with pre-existing community structures”; 
contestation between elected representatives and traditional leadership and 
inadequate resources, consequently hampering the effectiveness of the ward 
committee system (DPME, 2014:18). Besides, Piper and von Lieres (2008:19) argue 
that ward committees are not “empowering” or “participatory” institutions since they do 
not have functional decision-making power and have inadequate resources. As a 
result, ward committees are being turned into echo chambers where the decisions of 
ward councillors are rubberstamped (Matebesi, 2017; Piper and von Lieres, 2008:19). 
Using the analysis of Brooks (2017), these technical failures of the ward-committee 
system can partially be attributed to the ANC’s deep entanglement with retaining its 
mass movement status. Here, Brooks (2017) points out that there has been a 
tendency by high ranking ANC officials to conflate the role of the ward committees as 
conduits through which the party’s ideals of a National Democratic Revolution (NDR) 
could be realised. The result has been that generally political parties, rather than 
citizens, dominate these structures (Skenjana and Kimemia, 2011). 
The IDP processes have been subject to similar concerns. For example, in the 
context of IDP in the City of Johannesburg (CoJ) in South Africa, Friedman (2006) 





the voices of marginalised groups, consequently raising questions about the  
representivity of these spaces. He based his argument on the fact that the said 
process never appeared for deliberation before the ward committees for input by 
citizens. Rather, input from non-governmental organisations(NGOs), community-
based organisations (CBOs), labour and other service-orientated groups as well as 
representatives from the business sector was primarily solicited (Friedman 2006:8). 
On this basis, he concluded that the IDP in this instance primarily benefitted citizens 
who were organised and came from the more affluent social strata of the CoJ. 
Furthermore, even though IDP is supposed to reflect community input and preferences 
about the developmental trajectory of their localities over a five year period, 
Mukwevho’s (2012:33-34) research, in the context of Emfuleni Local Municipality, 
shows that community participation in IDP was limited to “information sharing” with 
residents rather than the community shaping their local development agenda through 
their active participation in the relevant IDP processes.  Maphunye and Mafunisa 
(2008:469-470) show that such weak community participation in IDP processes in 
South Africa is exacerbated by “fatigue” amongst municipal staff resulting from 
multiple consultative interventions with communities to shape the content of IDPs. 
There is also excessive reliance on private consultants by municipalities to develop 
their IDPs, which sometimes result in sidelining community inputs and contributions 
(Maphunye and Mafunisa, 2008). 
This section has clarified the complexity and challenges of decentralised 
participatory municipal governance. This section highlighted the influence of 
international development trends on the adoption of participatory decentralised 
governance in South Africa, but argued that the participatory nature of the country’s 
decentralised governance system was heavily influenced by local political conditions. 
Here, the discussion specifically accounted for the influence of historic participatory 
traditions of the mass civic movement against apartheid and how participatory 
governance is conceptually understood within the ruling ANC. The next section 
analyses how the fiscal context in which municipalities are located could potentially 
inform how they respond to community protests by specifically shedding light on the 






3.4 Fiscal decentralisation and municipal finances 
 
To better understand how and why municipalities respond to community protests in 
the way they do, it is prudent to explain the fiscal context in which municipalities are 
located. Therefore, this section first explains the funding model of municipalities within 
the country’s decentralised fiscal system and then proceeds to discuss some of the 
main fiscal challenges confronting municipalities.  
 The previous sections of this chapter collectively demonstrated that the country 
is politically and administratively divided into three spheres of government. This three-
way structural organisation of the state also has implications for the allocation of fiscal 
resources across the different spheres of government. Scholars describe this process 
as fiscal decentralisation, which they explain as the process of sharing state revenue 
between the distinct levels of government and the transferral of powers to collect 
revenue to each level (Koelble and Siddle, 2012). According to Wittenberg (2003:37), 
South Africa’s decentralised fiscal system consists of two key components, that is, the 
“decentralisation of revenues raised nationally” and “autonomous sources of funds” 
for each of the sub-national levels of government.  
 In terms of the first component of the country’s fiscal system, revenue sharing 
is the principle that guides the division of revenue collected by the national level of 
government across the local, provincial and national spheres of government. 
Momoniat (2002) indicates that the provincial sphere of government is completely 
dependent on fiscal transfers from the national level of government to perform its main 
functions and assigned duties, while the local level of government is partially 
dependent on such fiscal allocation. The Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act of 
1997 guides these fiscal allocative functions. This Act makes it incumbent on the 
National Parliament to introduce an annual Division of Revenue Bill that must provide 
detailed information on the amount of money allocated to each sphere of government 
and information about how funds will be shared across provinces and municipalities 
(Koelble and Siddle, 2012:170). Wittenberg (2003:37) points out that the Revenue Bill 
makes provision for the division of fiscal resources in three ways. First, fiscal resources 
are vertically divided between the national, provincial and local level of government. 
Here, fiscal allocations are determined through a participatory process of all spheres 
of government and the policy priorities of the state (Momoniat, 2002; Wittenberg, 





the provinces” (Wittenberg, 2003:37). This allocation is based on a formula that makes 
provision for the distribution of funds in accordance with the needs of provinces in 
respect of education, health care and social security, amongst other policy issues. 
This allocation is largely redistributive in nature and, as such, the distribution of funds 
occurs in a manner that ensures that less resourced provinces receive a greater share 
of the available revenue (Wittenberg, 2003). Lastly, a similar fiscal resource allocation 
process exists for the local level of government. This is the municipal equitable share, 
which is either transferred to municipalities as unconditional or conditional allocations 
(Koelble and Siddle, 2012).  Unconditional transfers usually intend to assist 
municipalities in executing their  constitutionally-assigned mandates. Thus, 
municipalities enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy as to how they spend 
unconditional transfers, so long as it complies with the relevant legislation that governs 
public expenditure (Koelble and Siddle, 2012:171). Conditional transfers, on the other 
hand, aim to assist municipalities with infrastructure investment and building the 
capacity of municipalities to execute their mandates more effectively (Koelble and 
Siddle, 2012:172). 
This brings us to the second component of South Africa’s decentralised fiscal 
system, that is, autonomous sources of revenue (Wittenberg, 2003). This component 
is mainly relevant to municipalities and their capacity to collect revenue from localised 
sources. According to Wittenberg (2003) and Koelble and Siddle (2012), municipalities 
possess powers to collect revenue through imposing property rates, levies and user 
charges for the services rendered to communities. At a theoretical level, this means 
that municipalities have additional sources of income and therefore are expected to 
raise most of their own income to ensure that they can discharge their developmental 
duties. However, in reality, there are multiple challenges with this feature of the 
municipal fiscal system, an issue I address in more detail in the next section of this 
chapter. 
As such, it becomes clear that municipalities in South Africa have two main 
streams of income. On the one hand, they operate on fiscal transfers from the national 
government in the form of an equitable share of national revenue, while on the other 
hand, they should also be able to collect revenue from the local populace over which 
they govern. However, how municipalities utilise and manage the fiscal resources at 





constitutionally-assigned mandates. In this regard, there is growing evidence that 
financial distress has seemingly become endemic to many municipalities for various 
reasons, including weak revenue collection practices, poor internal controls, corruption 
and malfeasance. Therefore, the remaining part of this discussion addresses these 
issues as some of the core fiscal challenges confronting municipalities.  
 
3.4.1 Municipal revenue collection  
 
Findings from previous studies highlight that the ability of municipalities to collect their 
own revenue is central to their long-term financial sustainability and being responsive 
to the needs of the communities over which they govern (Koelble and Siddle, 2012; 
Koelble and Siddle, 2014; Madumo, 2015). To this end, Koelble and Siddle (2012:161-
163) posit that municipalities theoretically should be self-sufficient, through their 
powers to collect their own revenue by imposing property “rates, user charges and 
other taxes”. Usually this source of revenue is complemented by the allocation of the 
municipal equitable share of the revenue collected by the national level of government 
(Koelble and Siddle, 2012:161). Despite municipalities having the powers to generate 
their own revenue, the inability of municipalities to collect their own revenue is a 
significant threat to their financial sustainability (Madumo, 2015:165-166) because 
less revenue implies less funding available to municipalities to perform their duties. 
This certainly has implications for the ability of municipalities to perform their functions 
and to provide uninterrupted access to services for communities. 
Koelble and Siddle (2014) support this line of reasoning as their findings 
highlight that municipalities are especially prone to financial distress, given that many 
of them experience problems of outstanding debt that they are either unable or 
unwilling to collect. Their findings, in particular, reveal that the inability of municipalities 
to collect this debt, is in part linked to weak municipal political leadership in respect of 
“debt recovery efforts; a failure to allocate sufficient resources to revenue collection; 
poor billing practices; unwillingness to use service cut-offs as debt management tools; 
and poorly designed revenue management and credit control policies” (Koelble and 
Siddle, 2014:1126). It is also important to consider that the poor revenue collection 
rate of municipalities is not only due to poor debt recovery systems or lack of 





For example, Molobela (2016) notes in areas where there are higher incidences 
of unemployment and poverty, the capacity of municipalities to collect revenue might 
be significantly constrained. The magnitude of outstanding municipal debt is showing 
no real signs of improving; a situation that might only push municipalities further into 
financial distress. For instance, Statistics South Africa (StatsSA 2019) highlights for 
the 2018 financial year alone outstanding municipal debt amounted to 72,4 billion rand 
across all municipalities combined. About 68 per cent of this debt was recorded as 
consumer debt, which implies that users of municipal services such as water, 
electricity, and refuse removal did not pay for the services rendered (StatsSA, 2019). 
This, of course, might undermine the financial viability of municipalities, as this means 
municipalities are unable to recover the money spent on delivering services. Here it is 
also important to account for the influence of structural factors such as the 
implementation of the Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) macro-
economic policy on the fiscal landscape of local government. The implementation of 
this policy shaped the capacity and ability of municipalities to deliver services to 
communities in important ways. In practice the implementation of GEAR necessitated 
a substantial rollback in funding to municipalities from the national and provincial levels 
of government (Cameron, 2001:113). This was an expression of the broader policy 
intention of GEAR to reduce public expenditure. The implications of GEAR for 
municipal management were that its policy prescripts placed substantial focus on 
privatisation of service delivery and the ability of municipalities to recover costs for the 
services rendered to communities (Parnell and Pieterse, 2002:82). In other words, 
municipalities were expected to assume greater responsibility for funding their own 
operations and their developmental mandates (Paret and Runciman, 2016:303). In 
turn, this meant that communities increasingly had to pay for basic services such as 
water, for example, from municipalities. This is not an unreasonable expectation; 
however, in contexts marked by high levels of unemployment and inequality, such as 
South Africa, a dramatic shift to privatisation of basic services inevitably cuts off 
access to services to citizens who are unable to afford it. For example, Mottiar and 
Bond (2012:317) point out that it is this very “commercialisation of municipal services” 
that has often been central to the discontentment communities express through their 
participation in protest action. As such, it becomes clear that the implementation of a 





certain degree pits municipalities and communities against each other. On the one 
hand, this policy framework makes it obligatory for municipalities to charge services in 
order to raise their own revenue, while those who are unable to pay for such services 
are excluded. Paret and Runciman (2016) argue that this situation is further 
compounded by the fact that the local level of government has experienced a steady 
decline in the allocation of unconditional grants to assist municipalities in rendering 
services to communities. On this basis, it is possible to infer that municipalities could 
potentially struggle to discharge all their constitutionally-assigned functions, while also 
battling to meet the demands levelled by the communities over which they govern.  
 
3.4.2 Budgeting and financial management 
 
The previous section showed that municipalities are increasingly under pressure as a 
result of limited access to revenue. Therefore, it becomes even more crucial for 
municipalities to manage their limited available financial resources efficiently. Given 
this reality, all municipal financial operations - planning, budgeting and accountability 
- are regulated by a combination of legislative instruments, including, but not limited to 
the Municipal Financial Management Act (MFMA) (Act 56 of 2003), the Municipal 
Systems Act (2000), the Municipal Property Rates Act (2004) and the Municipal Fiscal 
Powers and Functions Act (2007) (National Treasury, 2011:73). However, the MFMA 
(RSA, 2003) is central to this framework, therefore the discussion will first concentrate 
on some of the key relevant elements of this Act before it delves into the governance 
challenges related to municipal financial management in South Africa. 
The overarching objective of the MFMA (RSA, 2003) is directed at ensuring 
proper and sustainable management of municipal revenue and to establish 
appropriate financial standards and norms for the local level of government. As already 
noted, municipalities have a wide range of functions and developmental duties they 
must perform to ensure that they meet the basic needs of the communities they serve. 
However, for municipalities to discharge these duties, some degree of financial 
planning and budgeting is required. Thus, the MFMA (RSA, 2003) centralises the role 
of budgeting for this very reason. Section 15 of the Act prohibits municipalities from 
incurring expenditure that is not approved in a budget or expenditure that exceeds the 





municipal Councils to develop and approve annual budgets, which the Mayor must 
table at least 90 days before the commencement of the budgeted fiscal year. In terms 
of the overall governance of municipal finances as stipulated by the Act, Conradie 
(2004:12) shows that the Mayor is mandated to perform political oversight of the 
finances of the municipality by specifically providing fiscal leadership. The municipal 
manager, on the other hand, is the primary accounting officer, and is responsible for 
ensuring that the municipality complies with sound and transparent financial practices 
(Conradie, 2004:12). To further promote transparent and accountable municipal 
financial governance, the MFMA (RSA, 2003) requires municipalities to prepare 
annual reports containing detailed financial statements, consolidated financial 
statements and audit reports (Conradie, 2004:13). 
Despite the rigidity of the regulatory framework that governs municipal finances, 
the available data paints a stark picture of the state of municipal finances. The 2018 
State of Municipal Finances and Financial Management Report prepared by the 
National Treasury illustrates how deep the financial distress runs in a significant 
number of municipalities. In this regard, the report noted that at least 125 municipalities 
are challenged by cash flow problems that affect their ability to meet their monthly 
financial requirements and this contributes to growing municipal debt and 
overspending, alongside rapidly expanding consumer debt resulting in non-payment 
for municipal services (National Treasury, 2018:51). The report attributes the growing 
financial distress characterising municipalities to poor internal control of finances, 
inadequate and non-compliance with regulations and procedures as well as fruitless, 
wasteful, unauthorised and irregular expenditure (National Treasury, 2018:41). 
 Similarly, the 2019 Auditor-General of South Africa’s (AGSA’s) report on the 
municipal audit outcomes for the 2017/2018 financial year also highlighted that the 
audit outcomes of municipalities continued to regress, while irregular expenditure 
remained unacceptably high. This was in addition to growing weak consequence 
management for transgressions for reported irregularities and the emergence of 
institutional cultures in municipalities where auditors were increasingly finding it 
difficult to conduct their work (AGSA, 2019). For example, the AGSA (2019) 
disturbingly noted that only 19% of all municipalities supplied financial statements 
without material misstatements. This means that about 81% of all municipalities 





means that municipal financial statements contained errors possibly due to incorrect 
accounting procedures. Furthermore, irregular expenditure amounted to 25,5 billion 
rand across all municipalities. However, it must be pointed out that irregular and 
unauthorised expenditure does not necessarily imply that money was lost as a result 
of malfeasant financial practices or corruption. The AGSA (2011) highlighted that in its 
simplest form, irregular expenditure is incurred when public money is spent without 
complying with relevant legislation, and unauthorised expenditure refers to money 
spent over the budgeted amount or money spent on unplanned items (AGSA, 2011). 
However, the excessive nature of irregular expenditure opens space for possible 
malfeasance;  the report also indicates that about 74% of all municipalities did not 
sufficiently address allegations of “financial and supply chain management misconduct 
and fraud” (AGSA, 2019:9). 
With specific reference to the problem of internal control highlighted in the 
Treasury report, Ntonzima (2011) provides a comprehensive framework for 
understanding this governance challenge in municipalities. Ntonzima (2011:1018-
1019) notes that regulations alone do not necessarily assist in producing favourable 
internal financial control conditions for municipalities to manage their finances 
prudently. Furthermore, Ntonzima (2011:1018) states that effective internal financial 
control requires a serious commitment from senior municipal managers to mitigate the 
distortion of financial results, as they set the precedent for how subordinates apply 
control mechanisms. This should be complemented by efficient organisational 
structures, in which every individual in the municipal structure understands their role 
and responsibility as well as having effective internal audit functions. Moreover, 
internal control could be eroded under conditions where “incompetent” staff are 
managing financial information and where user-friendly written financial procedures 
do not exist (Ntonzima, 2011:1019). 
The issue of non-compliance with financial regulations is often advanced as the 
main source of the dismal audit performance of municipalities. However, Steytler 
(2008) points out that this performance of municipalities should not necessarily be 
perceived as wilful negligence by municipal staff but should be evaluated within the 
broader context of the legal strangulation of municipalities. This he describes as the 
situation under which excessive legislative instruments stifle the capacity of 





responsiveness negatively. Koelble and Siddle (2012) complement the ideas of 
Steytler (2008) rather well. They argue that the financial distress and the adverse audit 
outcomes that most municipalities experience should account for the reality of 
inadequate capacity within municipalities to manage their finances. Based on their 
research conducted across 37 South African municipalities, they found that only 31 
managed to submit their financial statements for auditing purposes within the required 
framework. While 16 of the 31municipalities in the sample dramatically overspent on 
their budgets (Koelble and Siddle, 2012:182). Wehlan (2002:240) provides tentative 
clues for budget over-expenditure, arguing that budgeting at the municipal level is 
often “unrealistic”, whereas others argue that these challenges could be attributed to 
the technical financial skills deficit that exists at the municipal level. For example, 
Cronje, Alexander, Kane-Berman, Holborn and Moloi (2014:28) highlight that staff 
directly involved in financial management, such as chief financial officers and supply 
chain managers, often lack the appropriate skills to manage municipal finances 
competently. This line of reasoning is supported by Peters and van Nieuwenhuyzen 
(2012) who also found that municipalities often appoint unsuitably qualified individuals 
in Budget and Treasury offices. This happens despite the minimum competency 
regulations that govern the process of appointing new staff at the municipal level. 
Several scholars have attributed the problem of appointing inappropriately qualified 
staff to strategic positions in municipalities due to the ANC’s cadre deployment 
strategy (Cronje et al., 2014; Masuku and Jili, 2019; Mbulawa, 2019).  
In addition, the financial distress plaguing municipalities is further aggravated 
by unscrupulous financial conduct (Ambe, 2016; Koelble and Siddle, 2012; Madumo, 
2015). Koelble and Siddle (2012) posit that the supply chain management process in 
municipalities is overly complex and often subject to poor implementation as many 
municipalities do not have the institutional capacity to ensure proper compliance with 
such processes. However, Madumo (2015) notes that apart from the lack of 
institutional capacity, political interference into supply chain processes is also a 
prominent problem across municipalities. He asserts that there has been a trend in 
some municipalities to reprimand and suspend municipal managers who refuse to 
appoint service providers that are politically connected to politicians serving on 
municipal councils (Madumo, 2015:163). For example, the Daily Dispatch Live 





situated in the Eastern Cape, was allegedly suspended three times for resisting this 
form of political interference into a 10 million rand community hall building project. Her 
lawyer argued that she was removed “from her position as she is perceived as an 
obstacle to certain tenders at the municipality being granted to certain companies” 
(Carlisle, 2020).  There is also evidence that municipal supply chain processes are 
sometimes manipulated to open access to business opportunities for family members 
of municipal employees and political representatives (Ambe, 2016:22). This arguably 
might expand the risk of failures in service delivery at the municipal level because of 
awarding service contracts to familial ties that do not have the appropriate capacity to 
deliver on service agreements. 
Yet, Ledger and Rampedi (2020) suggest that even if all these challenges are 
addressed, the financial distress plaguing municipalities will not necessarily be 
eliminated. They argue that municipal financial distress must be assessed in relation 
to some of the structural failures of the design of the fiscal framework of the democratic 
local government system. Their research shows that many municipalities in South 
Africa have failed to meet the standards in respect of their own revenue established 
by the White Paper on Local Government (Ledger and Rampedi, 2020). They point 
out that while the current fiscal framework assumes that all municipalities should be 
able to raise about 73% of revenue to fund their operations, most municipalities fell 
“short of their budgeted revenue” (Ledger and Rampedi, 2020:21). In this regard, their 
analysis showcases that a considerable chunk of potential municipal revenue is closed 
off from reaching municipalities due to Eskom’s role in providing electricity to many 
communities and the growing levels of consumer debt (Ledger and Rampedi, 2020). 
Furthermore, their findings also reveal that the role of local government in ensuring 
universal access to basic services to communities is curtailed by the pervasiveness of 
poverty and the fact that many consumers simply cannot afford to pay for services. In 
their view, the planners of the current local government fiscal framework could not pre-
empt this challenge during their initial conception of the system (Ledger and Rampedi, 
2020:24-25). Furthermore, they also argue that the White Paper’s inherent assumption 
that municipalities would have access to credit markets to enable them to collect 
additional revenue never eventuated in practice. In this regard, their findings highlight 
that urban metropolitan local governments have mostly benefitted from credit offered 





and Rampedi, 2020). This highlights that most municipalities are closed off from 
accessing credit that should assist them to implement revenue-generating 
infrastructural projects that could in turn be utilised to help municipalities fund their 
developmental mandates. 
From this discussion, it becomes clear that the financial viability and 
sustainability of municipalities are determined by a complex web of systemic and 
human factors. These different factors create a highly unstable financial context that 
may negatively influence the capacity of municipalities to discharge their functions and 
duties and this could fuel citizen frustration with poor service delivery that, in return, 
may find expression through protest action. However, there is also a chance that the 
state of municipal finances and the factors explored in this discussion could undermine 
the ability of municipalities to respond to community protest demands. The next 
section considers how fragility in the political-administrative interface influence the 
work experiences of administrative staff working in municipalities.  In an attempt to 
demonstrate how the conditions under which municipal staff work potentially inform 
responses to community protests. 
 
3.5 Analysing the work experiences of municipal administrative staff 
 
Administrative officials arguably play a critical role in the day-to-day management of 
municipal institutions. This inference is supported by Van der Walt (2015) who notes 
that members of the municipal administration are at the forefront of implementing 
policies and ensuring that communities have access to municipal services. From this 
perspective, we can discern that municipal administrators are central to the 
implementation of the developmental agenda of municipalities. Thus, to understand 
municipal responses to community protests, it is crucial to account for the work 
experiences of municipal administrative staff. Here, the political-administrative 
interface of municipalities serves as a useful frame for analysing their lived work 
experiences. 
This approach is useful as the political-administrative interface represents the 
point at which the work of political and administrative officials converges. While 
scholars disagree about the extent to which politics and administration should be 





2010; Sikhakane and Reddy, 2011), most of the available evidence shows that this 
particular interface is heavily politicised in the South African context. Here, the findings 
from previous research related to the effectiveness of this interface tell a tale of 
considerable discord, often with severe consequences for the political stability of 
municipalities and service delivery to communities (Cameron, 2003; De Visser, 2010). 
It is within this characterisation of discord of the municipal political-
administrative interface that we can glean tentative insights about how administrative 
officials experience their work. According to Masuku and Jili (2019) there is a deep 
sense of fragility within the political-administrative interface of municipalities, which is 
often a contributory source of strained working relations between political and 
administrative officials This trend arguably holds negative consequences for the 
effective functioning of municipalities; specifically because political and administrative 
officials presumably need to work collaboratively to ensure that municipal institutions 
can discharge their developmental duties. For De Visser (2010:95), the problem of 
strained working relations between political and administrative officials is partly a side 
effect of the conflation of the political-administrative domains due to the deployment 
of party members into municipal structures. He argues that these conditions, in some 
contexts, could create institutional cultures where formal accountability lines are 
blurred and with potentially debilitating consequences for service delivery due to 
dwindling staff morale. Sikhakane and Reddy (2011:96-97) support the assumption 
that dysfunctionality in the political-administrative interface may lead to the erosion of 
accountability. For them, the excessive politicisation of this interface dilutes the 
political neutrality required for the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms. 
Interestingly, their research findings also show that this challenge is exacerbated by 
the rise of contract-based administrative appointments. To some extent, this 
contributes to upward patterns of accountability to political heads because of concerns 
about employment security. 
Mafunisa (2010:556) further shows that tenuous political-administrative 
relations in municipalities, arising out of the problems raised by Masuku and Jilli (2019) 
and De Visser (2010), are compounded in instances where political heads and 
administrative heads belong to opposing political parties. This results in undue political 
intrusion into administrative processes and heavy participation in political affairs of the 





these trends arguably affect the entire organisational structure of municipal institutions 
and may further trigger institutional paralysis. For example, Mngomezulu's (2020) 
study on political interference in administrative processes at the Umlalazi Local 
Municipality in KwaZulu-Natal supports the assumption that undue political 
interference possibly contributes to increased incidences of occupational stress and 
burnout amongst administrative staff.  
Similarly, unstable political-administrative relations have also been linked to 
high turnover of administrative staff, which in turn hampers stability in access to 
service delivery. For example, in a study conducted by Pretorius (2017) on political-
administrative relations in selected municipalities in the Free State province, she found 
that excessively strained political-administrative relations sometimes result in forced 
early retirements and reshuffling of administrative officials to different departments. 
Her findings further show that this trend interrupts the implementation of service 
delivery programmes of departments (Pretorius, 2017:136). These findings are 
supported by Tshandu (2010) who also established that the effects of harmful political 
interference contributed to the drainage of human resources in the context of Buffalo 
City Municipality. These volatile working conditions produce feelings of “insecurity” 
amongst administrative staff (Tshandu, 2010:17). Here, it is plausible to deduce that 
communities could potentially bear the brunt of institutional instability caused as a 
result of strained political-administrative relations within municipal institutions. 
This discussion attempted to showcase the work experiences of administrative 
staff employed in municipalities. It specifically highlighted how they work under 
complex institutional conditions, where the excessive politicisation of the political-
administrative interface could potentially result in decreased levels of staff morale, 
blurred lines of accountability, concerns about employment security, occupational 
stress and burnout and increased incidences of staff turnover. These trends, in turn, 
threaten the overall functioning of municipalities and their ability to execute their 
developmental tasks. The next section explores how existing scholarly accounts have 






3.6 Securitised government responses to protests 
 
Most of the available research on municipal responses to community protests in South 
Africa has examined the impact of the prior application of municipal restrictions on the 
right to protest, particularly through the application of practices such as blanket bans 
on protests, manipulation of the RGA, abuse of the criminal justice system and the 
deployment of the police (Brown, 2015; Duncan, 2014; 2016;  and Royeppen, 2016). 
These scholars have mainly used securitisation theory as analytical lenses to examine 
state responses to protest action. Before contextualising how this body of scholarship 
has examined responses to protests, it is important to briefly reflect on the core 
theoretical assumptions of securitisation theory. 
Securitisation theory first emerged as a theoretical approach aimed at 
transcending the limitations of traditional understandings of security (Silva, 2014:2). 
Traditional approaches to security, which are heavily underpinned by realist 
philosophical assumptions (Šulovic, 2010:2), have tended to conceive security with 
protecting the integrity of the state from threats, often military in nature, emanating 
from beyond its geographical boundaries (Liotta and Owen, 2006:38). However, 
scholars recognised that the world system has become increasingly more complex, 
alongside the manifestation of new threats and risks to traditional understandings of 
security. This has resulted in the search for expanded definitions and conceptions of 
security to accommodate this shift (Šulovic, 2010:1). Subsequently, Duncan (2014:13) 
shows that constructivists started challenging the positivist conceptions of security 
espoused by scholars working in the realist school of thought. This saw scholars such 
as Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde (cited in Cardoso dos Santos, 2018) examining 
security in terms of how “speech” has a formative impact on “the decision-making 
process about security issues”. In other words, these scholars show how threats to 
national security are socially constructed by specific actors (Duncan, 2014:13). It is 
this body of scholarship that has largely become known as securitisation theory. 
According to Balzacq, Léonard and Ruzicka (2016:495), at the heart of 
securitisation theory is the hypothesis that once an issue is given substantial urgency 
as posing a threat, audiences may accept the responses of those entrusted with the 
power to handle the issue, regardless of the means used. In terms of its processual 





securitising agent (the actor who draws attention to a specific issue as a threat); a 
referent subject (the object/entity posing a threat); a referent object (an object/entity to 
whom perceived threats are directed); an audience (amongst which a shared 
understanding or agreement ought to exist to give legitimacy to the threat) and context 
and distinctive policies. It is this process which enables issues to be dislocated from 
the sphere of consensual democratic politics in favour of locating it within the “realm 
of emergency politics” where “rules and regulations” are not the first concern of 
decision makers (Taureck, 2016:54-55). Using this theoretical approach as the 
overarching prism to investigate state responses to protests in South Africa, Duncan 
(2014) and Royeppen (2016) argue that there is clear evidence the South African state 
has adopted securocratic mechanisms to regulate public protests; this is reflected in 
the increased manipulation of the Regulation of Gatherings Act (RGA, 1993) by 
municipalities, and more coercive police action. 
The RGA (1993) was implemented to support the constitutionally-enshrined 
right of citizens to demonstrate, but also to regulate how this right should be exercised 
and protected within the parameters of the Constitutional framework established post-
1994. Duncan (2014) notes that there is increasing evidence of irregularities in respect 
of how the regulations of the RGA have been interpreted and applied by municipalities 
and the police. According to Duncan (2014:137-138), in the period leading up to the 
2010 Soccer World Cup, evidence of “blanket bans” on protests was particularly 
prominent in Gauteng province. However, for Duncan (2014:139), this trend continued 
well beyond the 2010 World Cup when mounting evidence emerged in 2011 and 2012 
respectively that municipalities often treated “notices of intention” to demonstrate as 
appeals for “permission”. Furthermore, Duncan's research also shows evidence that 
some municipalities frustrated the right to demonstrate through delayed scheduling of 
meetings between conveners and the relevant authorities as well as the imposition of 
“unreasonable conditions” (Duncan 2014:139-140). Furthermore, Duncan (2014:150) 
also argues that protests have often been banned on obscure grounds and 
justifications that are not compulsory to comply with in terms of the conventions of the 
RGA. Some of these reasons include unavailability of recipients to receive 
memorandums, “the list of marshalls was missing”, “application was not made within 






These findings were corroborated in a subsequent study conducted by 
Royeppen who investigated the experiences of CBOs with protest and the RGA across 
South Africa. For instance, Royeppen's (2016:346-347) findings show that some 
CBOs’ attempts at organising protests against the relevant authorities were 
undermined by the imposition of monetary levies for “notifications” of intent to protest. 
According to Duncan (2016:77), the imposition of such fees is injudicious, especially 
given that the regulations contained in RGA do not oblige communities or any other 
organiser of a gathering to pay such fees. This trend unquestionably holds negative 
consequences for the right to freedom of expression by citizens who cannot afford to 
pay notification fees. Similarly, Royeppen's study also revealed that the protests 
organised by some CBOs were banned on grounds unknown to the organisers 
(2016:349), whereas the RGA makes it incumbent on the relevant authorities to supply 
the organisers with justifiable grounds for the prohibition of a gathering. 
Furthermore, Duncan (2014:151) argues that the criminal justice system in 
South Africa has to some extent become instrumental in shrinking democratic space 
for the expression of dissenting views by social movements. To this end, she highlights 
that some activists have often been arrested on charges of public violence and illegal 
gatherings, despite the lack of adequate evidence to secure successful convictions 
(Duncan, 2014:153). This often results in activists being locked up in drawn-out court 
proceedings, undermining their mobilising capacities and efforts. For Delaney 
(2016:10-11), this trend is tantamount to criminalising the right to hold dissenting 
views, which in turn drowns out the voices of marginalised communities. Such 
criminalisation increases the possibility of arrest or assault during protest action, and 
as a result instils a “culture of fear” that may sway some citizens from exercising this 
important constitutional right (Royeppen, 2016:351). Even though the capacity, 
training and resource constraints confronting Public Order Policing contribute to this 
situation, Duncan emphasises that these trends should also be seen in light of the fact 
that the South African government started articulating labour strikes and protest action 
as possible threats to national security (2014:274). This has in part contributed to the 
growing number of incidences involving coercive police force during protest action and 
restrictive prior limitations on protests by municipalities. 
As can be gleaned from the discussion above, this body of scholarship 





limited insights into the various factors that have a formative influence on the capacity 
of municipalities to respond to such protests. Thus, an examination of the factors that 
shape municipal responses that are rooted within the lived experiences of those who 
manage the municipal bureaucracy may assist in enabling a broader understanding of 
their responses to community protests. 
 
3.7 Gap in the literature 
 
This research is motivated by the fact that previous studies examining responses to 
community protests mostly used securocratic analytical lenses to study this 
phenomenon. At its core, this body of scholarship primarily focuses on investigating 
prior municipal restrictions placed on protests. To this end, scholars have highlighted 
that in some instances municipalities often abuse the RGA, co-opt the police to 
respond in restrictive ways and that the criminal justice system is often used to 
discourage citizens from participating in protest action.  
Another body of scholarship closely related to this dissertation is the research 
conducted on community protests in South Africa. Studies in this area have mainly 
concentrated on exploring the underlying causes of community protests, which mostly 
tie into broader intellectual discourses about the quality of governance and 
governance models, poverty, inequality and unemployment in South Africa. 
However, as this chapter has shown there is a paucity of research that directly 
explores the question of how municipalities respond to community protests and the 
institutional factors that inform how they respond from the standpoints of political and 
administrative officials employed by municipalities. It is this gap in the available body 




The chapter  situated municipalities in their appropriate context of the decentralised 
system of government implemented in 1994 which showcased how this structural 
environment could perpetuate community protests and shape municipal responses to 
it. The chapter further located municipalities within the country's system of cooperative 
governance and intergovernmental relations. Furthermore, the rise of participatory 





implementation of decentralisation and the wave of localised protests the country has 
experienced in democratic South Africa. In addition, the chapter analysed the main 
governance challenges confronting municipalities. Here, the focus was concentrated 
on the failures of decentralised participatory municipal governance; financial 
management practices of municipalities; the municipal political-administrative 
interface and the challenges of intergovernmental relations (IGR). This discussion 
pointed out that the governance challenges emanating from these issues pose 
numerous limitations to the capacity of municipalities to discharge their developmental 
functions. Finally, the chapter also highlighted that state responses to community 
protests are often analysed from securocratic analytical approaches that examine prior 
applications of municipal restrictions on protests. Most importantly, the chapter 
demonstrated the lack of systematic studies that investigate how municipalities 
respond to protests from the standpoint of political and administrative officials – 
























Chapter Four: Studying up – a methodological approach  
 
This chapter discusses the methodological approach I followed to analyse how the 
City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (CTMM) responds to community protests 
and the institutional dynamics that have a formative influence on its capacity to 
respond. This chapter commences with an outline of the overall research design of 
the study, alongside a discussion that justifies the adoption of a single-case study 
method and the selection of the CTMM as the case examined in this dissertation. I 
proceed with a discussion that considers the methodological implications of 
conducting research with elite participants, with specific reference to issues of access, 
establishing trust and my credibility as a novice researcher. The focus of the chapter 
then turns to illuminating the data collection methods I employed and its associated 
complexities. This is followed by a discussion of the sampling techniques used, the 
data analysis process, and the ethical considerations of the study. 
 
4.1 Research design 
 
This study sought to investigate how municipalities respond to community protests 
and to explore the factors that have a formative influence on municipal responses to 
community protests. Throughout the planning and implementation phase of this study 
it was not my aim to impose my understanding of municipal responses on the research 
participants. Instead, I was interested in developing an understanding, anchored in the 
lived experiences of the day-to-day work participants performed at the municipality. 
This required a research approach that would allow me entry to the institutional context 
in which participants perform their duties – as a means to develop a deeper 
understanding of the issues directly related to the questions this dissertation posed. 
Thus, the qualitative research paradigm from the outset was best suited to solve my 
main research questions, given that this approach is often used in studies when the 
researcher is interested in acquiring insights as to how participants experience 
particular contexts or processes  and to uncover the deep and complex details of the 
phenomena being examined (Atieno, 2009; Merriam and Grenier, 2019). Furthermore, 
Yin (2016:9) suggests that qualitative research is also well positioned to illuminate the 





while at the same time accounting for the fact that contextual factors have a direct 
bearing on how people experience their individual lived realities. 
In line with these normative benefits of qualitative research addressed above, 
this study was not conceptualised to test a hypothesis or to provide conclusive truths 
about how municipalities respond to community protests. The purpose was rather to 
explore the 'what' and 'how' questions of municipal responses to develop an 
understanding of these municipal responses. In other words, to get an understanding 
that is contoured by the complexity of the municipal system in which the research 
participants are expected to contemplate and implement responses to community 
protests.  
 
4.2 Case study design and selection 
 
The process of acquiring in-depth knowledge of a phenomenon is often described as 
a case-study approach in the social sciences (Baxter and Jack, 2008; Yin, 2014). It 
was impossible to study all 278 South African municipalities within the scope of this 
dissertation; therefore, I adopted a single-case study research design. Selecting this 
design equipped me with a methodological approach that allowed me to uncover some 
of the core issues that shape municipal responses to community protests in a 
manageable way. This methodological approach is particularly powerful because it 
enables social researchers to acquire unique and in-depth insights about the 
phenomenon under investigation (Rule and John, 2011:21; Vissak, 2010). This 
strength of the case study method motivated me to adopt this research design. It 
specifically enabled me to develop rich and varied insights about the issues that 
political and administrative officials must consider in their contemplation and 
implementation of potential responses to community protests. Furthermore, Yin (2016) 
argues that selecting a case study research design is best suited for understanding a 
specific case in its real-life context. This was a critical factor that motivated the 
adoption of a case-study research design for this dissertation. This assisted me in 
understanding the institutional complexity of the municipality and further aided my 
understanding of the role of political and administrative officials and the contextual 
conditions under which they are expected to consider responses to community 





between the institutional conditions, for example, the role of political factionalism, and 
how participants performed their functions with reference to responses to community 
protests. The main potential shortcoming of adopting this approach for this dissertation 
is how the selected municipality responds to community protests, and the institutional 
dynamics that shape its responses may not necessarily be the same across all 
municipalities in South Africa. This renders the overall generalisability of a single-case 
method as inherently limited (Meyer, 2001). However, because there are relatively few 
prior studies that have examined municipal responses to community protests in the 
way in which this dissertation does, the adoption of a single-case approach provided 
an opportunity to establish tentative insights about the research problem through 
answering some of the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions concerning a municipality’s response 
to community protests (Baxter and Jack, 2008:545). This study in no way sought to 
provide a representative account of municipal responses to community protests in 
South Africa in general. Instead, it aimed to contribute towards developing an 
understanding of the different issues that are at play when a specific municipality, that 
is the CTMM, responds to community protests.  
With these theoretical assumptions of case study research design in mind, I 
selected the CTMM as the case for examination in this dissertation given that it is 
empowered with a wide range of functions, specified in the Section 14 Manual of the 
CTMM (CTMM, 2017). This document reveals that the functions of the CTMM coincide 
with some of the core issues community protests often target as well as issues related 
to the discourse on decentralisation, which have been partly addressed in the literature 
review of this dissertation. Some of these include electricity, housing and human 
settlements, property rates, municipal health services, local amenities, refuse removal, 
refuse dumps and solid waste disposal (CTMM, 2017). Besides, the CTMM further 
presented itself as a useful case for analysis because it can be situated within the 
broader body of scholarship that examines rising levels of community protest action in 
South Africa – as documented earlier in this dissertation. In 2018 alone, without 
intention to emphasise frequency, several media accounts of community protest 
activity in the City of Tshwane have been documented, further justifying the relevance 
of the selected case for this research (see Sekhoto, 2018; Ngqakamba, 2018; Ndlazi, 
2018 and The Citizen, 2018). In the next section, I address some of the main 





4.3 Methodological implications of studying up 
 
I encountered several methodological complexities as a direct result of the nature of 
the research. As indicated in the preceding section, this research was conducted in a 
politicised institutional space. The research, therefore, constituted an intrusion into the 
day-to-day activities of a relatively powerful administrative and political elite who 
occupy senior positions within the municipality. Here it is important to note that I am 
not using the concept of ‘elite’ in relation to the personal socio-economic class position 
of the research participants. Instead, in this study elites are conceptualised following 
Lilleker’s notion, which constructs this group of individuals as those “with proximity to 
power or policymaking; the category would include all elected representative, 
executive officers of organisations and senior state employees” (Lilleker, 2003:7). I 
adopted this conception of elites since it coincides with the shared characteristics of 
the target population of this study. In other words, all the participants in this study 
occupied senior positions within their different divisions of the municipality. Thus, 
participants enjoyed a considerable degree of institutional power to make and enforce 
decisions within their respective departments given that four of them were divisional 
heads of their departments and another a Member of the Mayoral Council (MMC). 
Participants can further be characterised as elite when their institutional 
positions are considered in relation to the communities over which they exercise 
influence, specifically, communities that often use protest to draw the attention of the 
municipality to their lived experiences. This power differential between municipalities 
and communities is rather stark in the context of municipal responses, particularly 
because the municipality is empowered to respond to protests in multiple ways,  
ranging from accommodative to dismissive municipal responses. However, the 
municipality could also deploy the police to shape the outcomes of a community 
protest, for example. As such, the institutional power that the research participants 
derive from their positions in the municipality places them in a relatively privileged 
position.  This in turn enables them to exercise “more influence over political outcomes 








4.3.1 Negotiating access 
 
Selecting the case was easier than negotiating access to participants in the 
municipality. During the initial phases of designing this study, gaining access to the 
CTMM repeatedly surfaced as a potential difficulty that would challenge the successful 
completion of this dissertation. This was because the study sought to solicit the 
perspectives of individuals who had considerable power and influence within the 
municipality to protect themselves from the kind of intrusion this research presented.  
The first phase of the negotiation process required me to establish a connection 
with an insider at the municipality. After sending a few emails to the Office of the City 
Manager, my research request was eventually redirected to the central entry point for 
conducting research in the municipality. What followed was a relatively simple and 
obstacle-free process. I was placed in contact with the Director for Knowledge 
Management at the CTMM, who then invited me for a meeting to discuss how I 
intended to conduct the data collection process and to orientate me with the structure 
of the municipality. At this point, I was rather overwhelmed by the expansive 
organisational structure of the municipality as we worked at identifying the 
departments in which officials with intimate knowledge of my research topic would be 
located. This intervention was central to helping me navigate my way through the 
complexity of the municipality. 
During the meeting, the Knowledge Director shared her insights and 
experiences of working with external researchers. A substantial part of this discussion 
was positive in nature, but I was also forewarned that I would encounter challenges 
recruiting suitable participants. The Knowledge Director mentioned that officials 
receive numerous requests to participate in different research studies, which is in part 
responsible for the emergence of a culture of 'research fatigue' among officials. 
Nevertheless, this engagement was fruitful as the meeting proceeded in a climate 
under which the municipality’s Knowledge Division showed a genuine interest in my 
research topic and the potential benefits it held for the CTMM. In retrospect, this 
foresight was important, as it prepared me for the challenges I eventually encountered. 
Immediately following this engagement, I approached officials with a great 
sense of enthusiasm, which dissipated rather rapidly when responses to my interview 
requests were extremely slow or non-existent. This process of requesting interviews 





October 2019 without any success. This experience of struggling to gain access to 
elite participants is widely documented as a challenge in the available body of 
methodological literature (Liu, 2018; Mikecz, 2012; Richardson, 2014). This is often 
because elite participants possess a considerable degree of institutional power and 
resources to shield themselves from the kind of intrusion that social research presents 
into their realities (Mikecz, 2012). This dynamic was reflected when I submitted an 
interview request to one of the municipality’s MMCs and his secretary requested that 
I submit a copy of the questions I intended to ask during the interview. After submitting 
the interview schedule, I received no response, despite sending follow-up 
communication to both the secretary and the MMC. At this moment, I realised that the 
reluctance and perhaps discomfort amongst officials to participate in my study could 
be linked to the types of questions my research raised.  
This incident left me rather despondent about the prospect of completing this 
dissertation. Perhaps more importantly, it also led me to reflect on the implications that 
providing the interview questions to prospective participants in advance might have 
on the findings of the study. In trying to navigate this complexity, I encountered a blog 
post on ResearchGate, in which a group of researchers discussed the methodological 
issues associated with this practice. The post had about 34 contributors and their 
views varied from opinions that this practice could result in biased prepared responses 
that would undermine the integrity of the qualitative data collected. While others 
suggested that this practice would not necessarily be damaging if the researcher only 
offered a broad overview of the questions should prospective participants request to 
see the interview questions in advance (Rowe, 2015).  
At this stage, I was rather concerned that I was not going to be able to collect 
adequate primary data. Based on my experience with the MMC and the mixed 
discussion I encountered on Research Gate, I decided to request interviews, indicating 
to prospective participants that I could supply the interview questions beforehand. This 
was not an easy decision, as I was genuinely concerned that the data I would collect 
would be compromised due to the possibility of rehearsed responses. Surprisingly, the 
decision to do so marked a turn-around point in the lack of response I had 
experienced. Most interestingly, despite providing the option of supplying the interview 
questions beforehand, none of the officials I interviewed requested to see the 





about possibly collecting compromised data as a result of showing the questions to 
participants beforehand. It is important to point out that I cannot definitively conclude 
whether my willingness to supply the interview questions beforehand necessitated the 
change in the response rate, whether it was pure coincidence, or if participants were 
genuinely interested in my topic and had time to participate in research. Nevertheless, 
this became my strategy for securing interviews with officials.  
A key limitation in respect of access is that the findings of this study could have 
been enhanced significantly if I had had access to the extent where I was able to 
observe how the participants responded to community protests in real-time. This was 
not possible due to the nature of the access I was able to negotiate and the fact that 
there were no major community protests in the CTMM at the time I commenced the 
data collection process. However, the semi-structured interviews allowed me to probe 
the research questions adequately. There was a considerable degree of consistency 
in the narrative responses of participants during the interviews, which in part 
addressed the limitation of not being able to observe municipal responses to 
community protests in real-time. 
 
4.3.2 Establishing trust and credibility 
 
As already noted, I encountered significant challenges in recruiting suitable 
participants for this study, which in part might be linked to the chance that prospective 
participants were surrounded by powerful gatekeepers; the possibility that their time 
schedules might not have allowed them to participate; they could not contribute 
meaningfully to the research or that they were not interested in the questions my 
research sought to answer. When I eventually secured interviews with participants, 
the next challenge I encountered was contemplating how I would secure the trust of 
participants and present myself as a novice but credible researcher. In preparation for 
this, I read extensively on social science research methods and specifically literature 
on interviewing elites. 
In the context of this study, securing the trust of participants was a twofold 
process. I first had to ensure that I gained the trust of participants with my initial request 
for their participation in this study and during the actual interviews. I was able to gain 





and objectives of the research and how participant contributions would assist in 
meeting the research aims (Harvey, 2010). However, I had also leveraged my 
institutional affiliation with the University of South Africa (UNISA), where I work in a 
junior academic post, to gain the trust of participants - by communicating with 
prospective participants using my work email account.  Similarly, I used my student 
affiliation to the Centre for Social Change (CSC) at the University of Johannesburg 
(UJ), an institution that is well known for its influential research on community protests 
in South Africa. I suspect that my institutional affiliations might have persuaded 
participants that I was indeed genuinely interested in conducting academic research. 
I decided on this strategy as most of the literature on elite interviewing shares 
consensus that researchers must utilise their institutional affiliation as it assists in 
gaining the trust of participants and could enhance the credibility of the researcher. 
That, in turn may assist in reducing the power gap between the researcher and the 
researched (Harvey, 2010; K.Lancaster, 2016; Morse, 2019), an issue I return to in 
subsequent parts of this chapter. Preparing thoroughly for the interviews that included 
arriving on time at the interview venues, knowing exactly what I wanted to ask 
participants, and displaying knowledgeability about the research topic, possibly further 
enhanced my credibility as a novice researcher and gaining the trust of the research 
participants. 
 
4.4 Semi-structured interviews with elites 
 
Before I engage with the specific dynamics of interviewing elite participants, it is worth 
noting that I completed the fieldwork for this dissertation under rather unstable political 
conditions. At the time I commenced the fieldwork process for this dissertation, the 
CTMM was seemingly trapped in a state of perpetual political instability arising from 
the weak state of coalition politics that came to characterise its governance model in 
the wake of the 2016 Local Government Elections (De Klerk, 2018; Selisho and 
Kgosana, 2019). As such, the possibility that political instability in the CTMM 
influenced how participants responded to the interview questions and the findings 
cannot be ruled out completely. However, I do not view such influence as inherently 
negative, as it has the potential to provide a more authentic account of participants' 





The primary data collection instrument employed in this study was semi-
structured qualitative interviews. Liu (2018) posits that novice researchers interviewing 
elites should prepare sufficiently for each interview and should take special care when 
designing interview questions. As a novice researcher, I carefully developed an 
interview schedule containing open-ended questions directly linked to the main 
research questions posed by this study. To ensure that my questions were sound and 
well-positioned to obtain the data necessary to answer the main research questions, I 
shared the questions with my research supervisors who have extensive research 
experience. Doing this assisted me greatly as my supervisors suggested that I start 
my interviews by asking more general background information about the research 
participants, which Liu (2018) recommends as a good strategy for conducting 
interviews with elites.   
The benefit of using open-ended interviews is summarised as leaving 
participants “free to respond in whatever way he or she chooses…open-ended 
questions work well to elicit, rich, full and complex accounts from participants” 
(Magnusson and Marecek, 2015:47). On this basis, I used open-ended interview 
questions as I wanted the participants' responses to be reflective of their lived 
experiences of their location in the municipal structure. Furthermore, I used the 
interview schedule (See Appendices B and C) during each interview to ensure 
consistency in the data collection process. However, new questions arose during most 
of the interviews that stemmed primarily from the unique responses of the participants. 
At the start of each interview and as the interviews proceeded, I reminded 
participants that they did not have to answer all the questions. Liu (2018) suggests 
that this strategy is crucial in the context of elite interviews, as it allows for a more 
democratic interview structure in which the content is shaped by both the participants 
and the researcher. This approach further assisted in making the interviews more 
conversational and contributed to an atmosphere under which participants seemed 
relatively comfortable sharing their experiences and knowledge of municipal 
responses to community protests.  
On average, the interviews lasted for a minimum of 45 minutes, while others 
lasted longer than an hour.  With the informed consent of the participants (See 
Appendix A), I recorded all the interviews, to assist me in capturing the views and 





refuse to have our discussions recorded, given the political nature of the research and 
their positions within the municipality. To my surprise, none of the participants had any 
objection to being recorded. According to Richardson (2014:185), this willingness by 
the participants to be recorded could be related to their experiences of “speaking in 
front of the media and on the record”, as well as the fact that I assured them that the 
recordings would be safely stored on my secured personal computer under 
pseudonyms to protect their anonymity. It was for this reason that I also transcribed 
all the interviews myself to eliminate compromising the anonymity of the research 
participants. 
Furthermore, the challenge of power imbalances between elite participants and 
the researcher is articulated as one of the key obstacles to the data collection process 
in elite interviewing. Scholars suggest that elites are often well placed to dominate 
interviews because of their experience in leadership positions and their exceptional 
communication skills (Harvey, 2010; Liu, 2018). The issue of unequal power 
relationships during the semi-structured interviews I conducted did not present itself 
as a challenge in this study. I did not observe any overt attempts by participants to 
display their power or make me feel like they inherently had more power than I did - 
even when they did. 
In my interpretation of our interactions, there was a solid sense of mutual 
respect. This was established through participants’ willingness to answer the 
questions I asked and their sincere interest in the broader questions my study posed. 
However, this also required me to be conscious of my position, as there was a chance 
that I might have been perceived as an elite from the viewpoint of the participants as 
well. This could have been because participants knew that I was employed in an 
academic post at a university, which can be considered as an influential social 
institution. This specificity could have contributed to what seemed like an equal power 
relationship between the participants and myself during the interviews. The fact that 
my experience was different to most of the literature on power relationships between 
researchers and elite participants could also be linked to the fact that it is an expected 
norm for elites to engage citizens in countries of the global South (Morse, 2019). 
As noted earlier, the issue of unequal power relations was not a prominent 
challenge in this study. However, in one instance an interview took place several hours 





day, at around 15:30. The participant was in a rush to get through the interview rather 
than engaging in the interview as comprehensively as possible. This created 
conditions under which it was difficult for me to properly ask follow-up questions or ask 
the complete set of questions I had prepared for the interview. However, I used the 
interview for what it was, and I probed the parts that I deemed as crucial for the 
analysis, by quickly moving to the most important questions (Berry, 2002). While I 
proposed an alternative interview, the participant insisted on completing the interview 
as fast as possible. Furthermore, the interview was disrupted by several telephone 
calls, and I am uncertain to what extent these may have impacted on the participant’s 
responses. Initially, this encounter raised questions about the power difference 
between the participant and me. However, Morse (2019:287) argues that what I 
encountered was not so much a question of power, it was possibly more a sign of a 
weak institutional setting “since daily schedules in weak institutional settings are rarely 
written in stone”. This situation could also have arisen as a result of the participant not 
having adequate administrative support to ensure that the interview was properly 
scheduled in his diary. This specific issue arose when another participant forgot that 
we had agreed to a research interview. In this situation, I was required to reintroduce 
myself and to clarify the purpose of my visit to the municipality. The participant then 
expressed his apology and stated that he had completely forgotten about our meeting 




I used purposive sampling for this study. This involved identifying potential participants 
with the assistance of the Knowledge Director at the municipality after which I emailed 
interview requests to all qualifying participants. The selection criterion for inclusion in 
the sample was the participants' experience of being involved in municipal responses 
to community protests. This was necessary to ensure that I collected data that was 
rich and adequate to answer my research questions. Another criterion was the 
seniority of participants in respect of their institutional position. This criterion was used 
to make the sample size more manageable for the scope of a master’s dissertation. 
Also, the seniority of participants enabled me to gain an insight into how municipal 





high-level positions within the municipal structure. As such, the participants recruited 
for the study included divisional heads of service delivery and administrative 
departments and members of the Mayoral Council. The strength of this sampling 
technique was that I was able to interview senior municipal officials who had 
experiences of responding to community protests and who were available to 
participate in the study. The main drawback of using this sampling technique was that 
not all suitable participants were given an equal chance of participating in the research, 
which in turn limits the overall generalisability of the data. This drawback mainly arose 
because of time constraints and the fact that the response rate to my interview 
requests was underwhelming. As a result, I had to rely on participants who were willing 
to take part in the study. However, since this study does not aim to make statistical 
inferences about the data collected, purposive sampling was best suited for this 
dissertation. 
Consequently, a key limitation arising from the sampling method I employed is 
that the sample size was relatively small. The sample size was specifically affected by 
what I cautiously describe as an ‘unwillingness’ of municipal officials to participate, for 
reasons unknown to me. I draw this inference from the number of potential participants 
I submitted interview requests to, without receiving responses. Incidences of cancelled 
interviews, without specific reasons, were other factors that contributed to the eventual 
sample size used in this study.  However, as already emphasised, the research was 
not intended to provide broad generalisations about how the municipality responds to 
community protests and the factors that shape its responses. Therefore, the sample 
size was adequate to explore the research questions in enough detail. The descriptive 
summary of the research population group is shown below.  
 
Table 1 Descriptive summary of the sample 




05-Nov-19 Tshepo Acting Deputy Director 5 years Male 
05-Nov-19 Oteng Member of the Mayoral Council 3 months Male 
06-Nov-19 Natalie Director 3 years Female 
06-Nov-19 Kopano Director 9 years Male 






4.6 Data analysis 
 
I used thematic analysis to analyse the primary data collected through the semi-
structured interviews. During the initial phase of this process, I transcribed all the 
interviews verbatim in preparation for the coding and data analysis process. Following 
this, I read all transcripts several times to form an overall impression of the data. After 
I had developed an impression of the data set in its entirety, I read each transcript 
individually and started coding ideas and details I deemed significant to the overall 
research questions. I manually coded the data, mainly following the inductive coding 
process of Clarke and Braun (2016). I used a combination of codes formed using the 
words and ideas contained in participant expressions and self-generated codes based 
on ideas I had encountered in the literature. This was a continuous process of coding 
and recoding to ensure that I applied the codes consistently across the data set. 
Through following this coding process, five broad themes emerged from the data:  
protests, municipal responses, internal dynamics, external dynamics and contextual 
issues. These themes were informed by the data itself and the types of questions I 
had asked during the interviews. I then further examined these five themes, from which 
I developed sub-themes that were made up of similar, unique and recurring ideas. As 
such, the findings reported in this study are reflective of the dominant issues that arose 
from the sub-themes.  
 
4.7 Rigour and trustworthiness 
 
Reflecting on the rigour and trustworthiness is a crucial component of qualitative 
research. This practice enables other researchers to evaluate the ‘soundness’ of the 
methodological approach followed and the ‘integrity’ of the overall conclusions derived 
from the research data (Noble and Smith’s, 2015:34). This practice is also imperative 
given that erroneous research findings ‘could result in the adoption of dangerous or 
harmful practices’ (Long and Johnson, 2000:30). Consequently, qualitative 
researchers must ensure that their research complies with the four main criteria, 
including credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability, used to measure 





First, credibility is broadly concerned with the extent to which the research 
findings are representative of the entire data set (Thomas and Magilvy, 2011). In other 
words, the findings of qualitative research studies must aim to provide an accurate 
reflection of the views of all the research participants. While credibility may be 
achieved through multiple strategies in this study I specifically relied on debriefing 
sessions to enhance the credibility of my research findings. This process entailed 
monthly meetings with my research supervisors in which we debated the data analysis 
process and the emergent findings (Anney, 2014; Long and Johnson, 2000; Shenton, 
2004). These debriefing sessions were instrumental in broadening my analytical 
lenses and assisted in illuminating the multiple perspectives from which my primary 
data could possibly be analysed. This enabled a more rigorous and nuanced analysis 
of the data. I further ensured that participation in the study was voluntary. This 
approach holds potential benefits for the collection of dependable primary data. Since 
voluntary participation, assists in recruiting research participants who are  ‘genuinely 
willing to take part and prepared to offer data freely’ (Shenton, 2004:66). I further 
attempted to enhance the credibility of the data by closely examining the interview 
transcripts to check for similarities and differences in participant accounts (Thomas 
and Magilvy, 2011). This assisted in developing a representative account of the views 
of the research participants. 
Second, transferability refers to the extent to which the ‘research findings or 
methods’ are applicable to different contexts (Thomas and Magilvy, 2011:153). As 
noted before, this study used a relatively small sample, as such, it is unlikely that the 
same research findings will be produced in a different municipality. Here, it is important 
to reiterate that this study never intended to provide conclusive truths about municipal 
responses to community protests. Therefore, meeting this criterion to ensure 
trustworthiness mattered less in this dissertation. However, from a methodological 
perspective, this dissertation meets the transferability criterion. Specifically, because 
I documented a detailed account of the methodological approach followed and the 
decision-making that informed my methodological choices – this renders my approach 
replicable in different research contexts.  
Furthermore, I have also undertaken an effort to ensure that this dissertation 
complies with the dependability criterion of trustworthy research. This is evidenced by 





followed that could be repeated by different researchers (Shenton, 2004:71) in the 
preceding sections of this chapter. Similarly, I provided thick descriptive detail about 
the particular institutional conditions under which the fieldwork component of this study 
was executed. Yet, because of the qualitative nature of this study and the subjective 
accounts of the participants, there is no guarantee that the same findings will be 
yielded if the methodological approach is replicated in a different municipality.  
 Finally, confirmability is also considered as an important element in measuring 
the trustworthiness of qualitative research. For Thomas and Magilvy (2011) 
confirmability is aimed at ensuring that the research process is conducted in an 
objective manner. Arguably to reduce the influence of personal biases of the 
researcher (Shenton 20014). In an attempt to enhance the confirmability of this 
dissertation, I triangulated the interview data with other sources, such as the Integrated 
Development Plan Progress reports of the municipality and existing scholarly work. 
Similarly, I also assessed the shortcomings of some of the methodological choices I 
made and their implications for the overall research findings to further enhance the 
trustworthiness of the findings. 
 
4.8 Ethical considerations 
 
Conducting social research places an enormous ethical obligation on researchers to 
protect the rights of research participants and to not cause them personal harm;  
particularly because social research “deals with issues that affect them” personally 
(Gray, 2004:58). To ensure that my research held no potential harm for the research 
participants, my research proposal was scrutinised and cleared by the University of 
Johannesburg (UJ) Faculty of Humanities (see Appendix D). I was also required to 
obtain permission from the CTMM before I could commence with the data collection. 
This process involved me submitting my university-approved research proposal to the 
Knowledge Management Division of the CTMM where the proposal was further 
scrutinised to ensure that it complied with the municipality’s internal research ethical 
standards. 
Furthermore, because this study was conducted in a highly politicised domain, 
protecting the anonymity of the research participants emerged as one of the most 





serious risks for the participants if they were to be identified in the data reported in this 
dissertation. Some of these risks included possible exposure to reprisal from more 
powerful officials in the municipality and compromised job security (K.Lancaster, 
2016). Although not explicitly stated by participants, I noticed from some of the 
participants’ statements during the interviews that they felt there were risks. For 
example, the interview extract below between one participant and myself brings this 
issue into full view:  
 
N: There’s a definite thing, you have people who supposedly…[sighs 
heavily]…I don’t know if I should say this.  
 
I: You do not have to say anything…if it makes you feel uncomfortable.  
 
N: Okay, let me put it in a nice way. (Natalie, interview 6 November 
2019) 
 
In a separate instance another participant made the following statement at the end of 
the interview “I hope I did not say anything controversial” (Oteng, interview 5 
November 2019). During these moments of the individual interviews I conducted with 
Natalie and Oteng, I realised that the research participants might have been more 
vulnerable than I had initially anticipated during the conceptual phases of the research. 
Thus, I was confronted with a dilemma of how best to protect their anonymity. To 
overcome this complexity, I decided not to provide any professional information about 
participants other than specifying that all of them served as the heads of their 
departments or members of the Mayoral Council. I also did not include such 
information in the transcripts, to mitigate any possible risks, even though no one else 
had access to the transcripts. Similarly, I also refrained from reporting any primary 
data that exposed the specific nature of the job activities of participants or the 
departments in which they are located. This kind of data could contain information 
from which participants could be identified, and, in turn, would have compromised their 
anonymity. Yet, it is also important to mention that this was a careful balancing act for 
me since I had to ensure the anonymity of the participants, while also making sure that 
anonymising the participants did not compromise the integrity and authenticity of the 





Soliciting the informed consent of participants was another critical ethical 
consideration in this study. This required me to be as transparent as possible about 
the objectives of my research. Thus, in the initial phases of recruiting participants for 
the study, I fully explained the purpose of my research and the core themes that would 
be probed during the interviews. Doing this provided an avenue for the research 
participants to evaluate whether they were prepared to contribute to the findings of 
this study and to assess the extent to which they may be required to disclose sensitive 
information about their work at the municipality.  In other words, this helped to obtain 
the informed consent of participants. 
During the actual interviews, I explained the aims of the research to participants 
again and reminded them that their participation was entirely voluntary and that they 
had the right not to answer questions they did not want to. I also encouraged 
participants not to express any information that made them feel uncomfortable, as can 
be gleaned from the interview extract above between Natalie and me. I also reassured 
participants that their identities would be protected and that the recorded interviews 
would not be shared with anyone else; thus encouraging the participants to be open 
about the issues my study investigated. It is for this precise reason I also transcribed 




In this chapter, I discussed the specific methodological approach I followed to find 
answers to the main research questions posed by this dissertation. I started by 
justifying why a qualitative research design was adopted and why a single-case study 
method was best suited for this dissertation. This chapter also addressed the 
methodological complexities I encountered as a result of researching elite participants 
and how I navigated challenges of access to participants. Furthermore, the chapter 
also justified how semi-structured interviews and the employment of a purposive 
sampling technique fitted the aims of the study. I further assessed the strategies 
implemented to enhance the trustworthiness and rigour of the research. I concluded 
the chapter by reflecting on the ethical challenges I encountered while conducting 
research in a politicised institutional environment. In the next chapter, I present the 





Chapter Five: Analysing municipal responses to community 
protests – A cauldron of issues 
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an analysis of the main findings of this study. I 
start by documenting the most recent political history of the CTMM to illuminate the 
specific political context of the municipality. This is intended to assist the reader to 
locate the findings in its appropriate institutional context. The second section brings 
into focus the character of municipal responses to community protests. This analysis 
reveals a two-way conceptualisation of municipal responses to community protests, 
that is, political and administrative responses. I then proceed to analyse how 
community protests are viewed by senior municipal administrators and political 
officials in section three. Here, the analysis of the data showcases how the Regulation 
of Gatherings Act (RGA) of 1993 is operationalised as an instrument to gauge the 
legitimacy of community protests. The analysis then turns to participant framings of 
community protests, in which I examine how their framings of protest might inform 
municipal responses. The fourth section addresses the factors that have a formative 
influence on the capacity of the municipality to respond to community protests. In this 
section I focus the analysis on the following areas: the contradictory pressures arising 
from municipal budgeting and compliance with financial regulations, and the influence 
of political factionalism on administration as key issues. The final section explores the 
role of intergovernmental relations as a factor in municipal responses to community 
protests, along with an examination of the challenges that arise out of community 
uncertainty about municipal competencies and tensions in intergovernmental relations 
as the key sub-themes of this section. 
 
5.1 Setting the scene: The City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 
 
This section outlines the most recent political history of the CTMM in an attempt to 
provide the appropriate context in which the findings should be located. This is 
important since the findings are reflective of how the specific political conditions of the 
municipality might have influenced how participants engage the formulation of 
municipal responses to community protests. The most recent political developments 
relevant to the findings of the current study can be traced back to the wave of protests 





to the intensity of the internal factionalism that characterised the ANC at the time 
(“Tshwane protests flare”, 2016; Kekana and Lindeque 2016; Nicolson 2018). 
According to Kgatle (2017), the announcement of Thoko Didiza as the ANC’s mayoral 
candidate in the CTMM ignited the spate of protests leading up to the local government 
election. Communities retaliated with protests to this announcement, as the preferred 
mayoral candidates submitted by the region were reportedly disregarded by the ANC 
(Kagatle, 2017). On the 3rd of August 2016, election day arrived. This was a moment 
that was widely speculated to be a watershed local government election since the 
country’s transition to democracy. As the initial election results trickled in it was clear 
that control over the CTMM’s Council was hotly contested by political parties. When 
the final results were tallied, the DA secured 43.1% of the total vote, the ANC 41.2%, 
the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) 11.7%, FF+ (Freedom Front Plus) 1.9%, and 
the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), Congress of the People (Cope) and 
the Pan African Congress (PAC) less than 1% respectively (Areff, 2016). In the 
absence of an outright victory for any of the political parties, the DA formed a coalition 
government with Cope, ACDP, FF+ and the United Democratic Movement (UDM) to 
unseat the ANC from power in the CTMM (“DA announces coalitions”, 2016). Soon, 
the EFF also pledged to support the DA coalition government with other smaller parties 
if the need arose, despite not concluding a formal coalition agreement with the DA 
(Marrian, Quintal, Mabuza and Dlamini, 2016).  
While I conducted the research in 2019, the political conditions in the CTMM 
showed that the DA-led minority administration was seemingly unable to evade the 
complexities that come with coalition politics. The battle for control over the CTMM 
increasingly started dominating the political landscape in 2018 as several political 
outfalls between the DA, ANC and EFF intensified. For example, in 2018, the ANC 
instituted a motion of no confidence against the then Mayor Solly Msimanga for his 
alleged involvement in a dubious 12 billion rand tender deal (De Klerk, 2018). On a 
separate occasion, the EFF also instituted a motion of no confidence against the 
mayor, claiming that he had failed to “consult coalition partners, prioritising white 
members in his caucus, appointing unqualified staff, and seeking to suspend his City 
manager” (Nicolson, 2018). Neither motions of no confidence were passed, as the 
ANC on its part withdrew the motion of no confidence, while the EFF’s motion was 





mayor Solly Msimanga”, 2018). In response to these developments, the DA accused 
the ANC and the EFF of maliciously attempting to destabilise the CTMM administration 
(Maromo, 2018). Regardless of what the truth might have been, what is clear is that 
this form of political rivalry disrupts the core functions of the Council and perhaps the 
municipality more generally. 
This trend continued well into 2019 and was the primary driver of the growing 
instability that came to characterise the administration of the CTMM. For instance, in 
January 2019 the then Mayor Solly Msimanga tendered his resignation, after suffering 
severe reputational damage for his alleged involvement in a 12 billion rand tender 
scandal (Selisho and Kgosana 2019). While Msimanga stated that his resignation was 
necessary to further his political aspirations for Premiership of Gauteng province, the 
Mail and Guardian reported that his “resignation came amid claims that he was pushed 
out of the CTMM by his party because of unsatisfactory performance and endless 
scandals such as the hiring of unqualified officials in his office and the multibillion-rand 
GladAfrica scandal” (Madia and Mitchley 2019).  
When I commenced the fieldwork component for this research early in 
November 2019, the CTMM was already caught in a web of instability primarily 
resulting from the state of coalition politics in the CTMM. This was in part because the 
informal cooperative governance arrangement between the DA and the EFF had 
already disintegrated in July of the same year. This collapse arose as a result of a 
political dispute over which party was to govern the CTMM (Nyathi, 2019). The EFF 
demanded that the CTMM Mayor be replaced with an EFF political representative and 
that its members be elected to the mayoral committee, but this proposal was rejected 
as “unworkable” by the DA (Khumalo and Masuabi, 2019). 
Following the completion of my fieldwork, the real extent of the political 
instability in the CTMM was laid bare. This period, in particular, saw the new Mayor 
Stevens Mokgalapa, who was appointed following Msimanga's resignation, being 
ousted (Mailovich, 2020). Similar to his predecessor, Mokagalapa's term was also 
marred by controversy involving an alleged “sex scandal” that implicated him and a 
member of his mayoral council (Moatshe, 2019). Other alleged transgressions 
included his lack of leadership around the water crisis in Hammanskraal, “the irregular 





mayor was eventually removed from his seat of power through a motion of no 
confidence passed by the EFF with the support of the ANC (Kgosana, 2019). 
It is the very political vacuum established in the aftermath of Mokagalapa being 
outvoted as the mayor of the CTMM that motivated the National Council of Provinces’ 
(NCOP) decision to place the CTMM under administration for a range of different 
governance failures in March 2020. Many of these failures identified by the NCOP 
were related to the state of participatory democracy in the CTMM, specifically the 
failure of Council to establish a functional ward-committee system; service delivery 
failures, instability of council meetings; irregular tender processes; irregularity in the 
appointment of staff and irregular, fruitless and wasteful expenditure (NCOP, 2020). 
However, the DA has repeatedly accused the ANC and EFF of wilfully undermining 
the Council of the CTMM. This situation propelled the DA to approach the Gauteng 
High Court in an attempt to have the decision to place the city under administration 
reversed (Mitchley, 2020). The DA was successful in its legal attempt to set aside the 
decision to place the City under administration. This incident and several other events 
discussed above bring the magnitude of the challenge of instability into focus. It is in 
this context of instability that the findings of this study should be viewed, as these 
political events may have had an impact on how the participants responded to the 
interview questions. In the next section, this chapter turns to an analysis of the nature 
of municipal responses to community protests.  
 
5.2 Analysing municipal responses to community protests  
 
Based on the analysis of the data, municipal responses to community protests is 
conceptualised as political and administrative in this dissertation. The analysis 
highlights that political responses often take aim at providing immediate relief to 
protest issues, de-escalating protests and attempting  to limit future protest eruptions 
through appropriate planning. On the other hand, administrative responses are 
reactively implemented to address the grievances of protesting communities. This two-
way conceptualisation of municipal responses arose from a thematic analysis of 







5.2.1 Political responses 
 
The analysis of participant views revealed that the first category of municipal 
responses to community protests can be conceptualised as political. This 
conceptualisation of municipal responses rests on the assumption that political 
representatives possess a certain degree of institutional authority to make decisions 
about matters that fall within the scope of its competencies. Here, it is necessary to 
point out, that even though responding to community protests is not an inherent 
function of municipalities - they are still required to respond. Particularly, since the 
eruption of community protests is frequently linked to community experiences and 
perceptions about the quality of municipal services and governance amongst other 
issues. Thus, the institutional authority to make decisions about these protests is 
reflected by how the municipality responds to community protests. In the analysis 
below, political responses to community protests are demonstrated empirically by 
deploying political representatives to protesting communities to perform a range of 
political functions. Including providing relief assistance to communities, de-escalating 
community protests and legitimising the grievances of protesting communities. A more 
detailed analysis of political responses in line with this conceptual outline now follows. 
Participants shared consensus that immediately following the eruption of 
community protests, political representatives are nominated to address protesting 
communities. For example, Tumelo commented: 
 
You will then have the executive mayor on that day for the 
memorandum to be submitted by those who are protesting. (Tumelo, 
interview 5 November 2019) 
 
In this instance, Tumelo shows that the deployment of political officials to protesting 
communities, as a political response, is primarily implemented to accept 
memorandums or petitions submitted by communities. This is arguably a crucial 
municipal intervention as it represents an acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the 
concerns raised by communities through protest action, because protesting 
communities often include being addressed by political officials as part of their 
demands. As such, even though this practice might not necessarily constitute a 





de-escalating the turmoil or violence associated with community protests. Similarly, 
Tshepo noted:  
 
There will always be a high-profile delegation that goes out, particularly 
political high-profile delegations, and meet with those people and 
make those promises to cool it down. (Tshepo, interview 5 November 
2019)  
 
Here, Tshepo supports the premise that the deployment of political officials is 
instrumental to curbing the escalation of community protests, given his explicit 
emphasis on “cooling it down”. This finding is broadly supported by the research of 
Von Holdt and colleagues (2011:44) who argue that “distant” and “uncaring” political 
representatives are often propelled to respond to the grievances of communities, once 
they engage in disorderly and violent forms of protest. However, Tshepo notes that 
political responses also tend to be promissory in nature. From this it can be deduced 
that even though this form of response has the potential to restore order in protesting 
communities and enables the municipality to engage communities about their 
concerns, political responses might also fuel protests if such engagements are not 
effectively used as an opportunity to address the grievances of protesting 
communities. Thus, the extent to which the deployment of political officials as a 
political response transforms the communities’ grievances should be at the centre of 
evaluating its effectiveness.  
In the following statement, Oteng clarifies an additional role of political 
responses. He commented: 
 
We play an indirect role in responding to protests, in the sense that 
whatever communities are protesting about, we take it back to the 
departments, where the role of departments are to provide us with a 
plan on how they intend to resolve the issues. (Oteng, interview 6 
November 2019) 
 
Here, we can discern that apart from political responses constituting an 
acknowledgement of the legitimacy of protest grievances and mitigating the escalation 
of protests (see Von Holdt et al, 2011) this form of response is also implemented as 





administrative responses (addressed below). Oteng’s viewpoint further shows that 
political officials are not directly involved in shaping administrative responses to 
community protests but rather that they monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of such 
responses.  
 
5.2.2 Administrative responses 
 
Administrative responses is the second conceptualisation of municipal responses that 
arose from the analysis of the primary data. I conceptualise these responses as being 
administrative as they are service-based interventions, coordinated and implemented 
by different administrative/service delivery departments of the municipality. Based on 
participant descriptions of these responses, administrative responses are seemingly 
reactive service-based interventions aimed at addressing the grievances or demands 
of protesting communities. For instance, in his description of short-term responses 
Oteng noted: 
 
There are things we can respond to now, like issues, say for example 
it's an informal settlement and they require water provision and the 
provision of mobile toilets. That I can make a call and say okay, send 
how many tankers to this place and send how many toilets to this place 
because they don't have, then we address that. (Oteng, interview 6 
November 2019) 
 
In this scenario, Oteng sketched a situational picture of what a short-term response to 
a community protest might look like in practice. Here, Oteng highlights that the 
immediate response of the municipality is to provide relief to the issues a community 
might be protesting about through the provision of appropriate services that fall within 
the scope of the competencies of the municipality. This response pattern is justifiable 
as it demonstrates a degree of responsivity of the municipality to communal 
grievances raised through protest action, especially under conditions in which 
communities experience compromised or no access to certain basic services. 
However, Oteng’s argument that a short-term response can be implemented by 
making a phone call to an appropriate department also raises concerns. His assertion 
implies that in some instances responding to protest demands in an accommodative 





communities must resort to protest action to propel the municipality to implement 
service-based responses that form part of the core competencies of the municipality. 
At this point of the analysis, this response pattern is possibly symptomatic of weak 
prioritisation of community needs. In a rather similar description Tshepo commented:  
 
Usually, if it is people who march and they demand a graded road, 
maybe there are problems with access to their informal settlement. 
They want us just to grade, we can usually do that within a week, or in 
a day, we can actually send a grader out. (Tshepo, interview 5 
November 2019) 
 
In this instance Tshepo also highlights the reactive service-based nature of 
administrative municipal responses to community protest demands. But more 
importantly, he seemingly corroborates the argument that communities do not  
necessarily have to protest for the formal recognition of their needs to be seen as 
important by the municipality. The implied meaning contained in Tshepo’s comment is 
that municipal responses to community demands that arise through protest action 
might not necessarily be an overly complex task. He uses the element of time to reflect 
this dynamic when he suggests that “we usually do that in a week or a day”.  One 
possible explanation for this seeming reactive character of service-based municipal 
responses described by participants could possibly be linked to the overly political 
conceptual constructions of the underlying causes of community protests, an issue I 
address in detail in the next section of this chapter. For example, if administrators or 
politicians who are at the forefront of responding to community protests primarily view 
protests as malicious expressions of political party rivalry, a chance exists that the 
legitimacy of such protests is at risk of being undermined. Consequently, 
administrators and politicians might potentially be less inclined to view community 
protests as serious enough to demand responses from the CTMM. This idea of 
reactive service-based municipal responses to community protests was embedded in 
the commentary of many of the participants. For instance, Katlego's comment 
succinctly captures this theme. He said: 
 
If there is an issue of a pipe that has burst, and we've got the stock 
and the maintenance programme that addresses that from time to time 





have spare pipes and because we have a maintenance team. It is 
there in our plan, it is there in our maintenance. We are expecting that. 
Should it happen that one pipe is broken, or whatever, we will take a 
new pipe and fix it. There's a cable it's no longer working, and we have 
lots of cables, we'll tell the community, within three days we'll do that. 
(Katlego, interview 8 November 2019) 
 
In this account, Katlego shows that in some instances responses to community protest 
demands are already covered in the maintenance plans of the municipality. Yet the 
question of why it takes a protest to draw the attention of the municipality to basic 
issues as described in Katlego’s commentary and that of his colleagues, still stands. 
The reactive character of administrative municipal responses reflected in Katlego’s 
account and that of his colleagues does not necessarily imply that administrators and 
politicians are wilfully blind or ignorant of the challenges and concerns of communities; 
instead, it raises questions about the state of participatory democracy of the CTMM. 
Here my argument is that participatory governance practices between the CTMM and 
its residents can assist municipal administrators and politicians with a sense of 
familiarity with the socio-economic and political challenges of communities. Thus, in a 
context in which there are limited participatory exchanges between the municipality 
and communities, the reactive nature of municipal responses to community protests, 
reflected in the accounts of Katlego and the other participants, is hardly surprising. 
Evidence contained in the CTMM’s 2019 IDP review for the 2017/2018 budget 
period report supports the argument that fragile participatory democratic practices in 
the CTMM is a possible contributory factor to a weak sense of familiarity with the 
challenges experienced by communities. With specific reference to IDP, as a 
participatory governance mechanism, the same report displays evidence that 
community input into the IDP process was solicited. Yet this report also reveals 
multiple instances whereby several communities situated in the CTMM registered 
complaints of elected representatives ignoring the issues of communities and being 
unresponsive to their plight. For example, in Rooiwal, a community situated in region 
2 of the CTMM, a concern was expressed about the predominant use of English as 
the medium of communication (CTMM, 2019:142) as well as the potential costs of 
excluding those who do not understand the language. In Atteridgeville, the community 
expressed concern about the lack of feedback on public meetings hosted by the 





dissatisfaction with the lack of feedback on the IDP review meeting of the previous 
year. In Bronkhorspruit, the community questioned what criteria the CTMM used to 
invite communities to the IDP consultative forum (CTMM, 2019:154). 
Based on this, I argue that the depth of participatory democracy in the CTMM 
is not strong enough to equip administrators and politicians with intimate 
understandings of the challenges experienced by communities. In other words, there 
is a disconnect that should link the Executive, ward councillors and communities in the 
CTMM. Therefore, the reactive nature of administrative responses to community 
protests can thus, in part, be attributed to the failures of representative democracy in 
South Africa. The reactive nature of administrative municipal responses to protests 
embedded in participant expressions is arguably indicative of the limitations of 
institutionalised participatory democratic practices, which have not reduced the 
physical distance between elected representatives and the constituencies they 
represent. This, in turn, perpetuates the weak sense of involvement of representatives 
in the lived experiences of communities. This finding is largely consistent with the 
research findings of scholars such as Booysen (2015). The next section of this chapter 
examines how community protests are viewed by political and administrative officials 
and the associated implications for municipal responses to community protests.  
 
5.3 Community protests: A view from the top 
 
This section illuminates how community protests are understood by those working in 
municipalities. This is important to unpack as how municipal officials view protests is 
likely to impact their responses to them. Here, the practice of using the RGA as an 
instrument to measure the legitimacy of community protests, and officials viewing 
community protests primarily as expressions of political factionalism, emerged as the 
two main themes. The importance of these themes is that they hold possible 
consequences for municipal responses to community protests. It is imperative to 
highlight that I did not ask participants to define community protests. Therefore, the 
views explored below reflect how participants discussed the concept more generally 
to the different questions I posed during the interviews.  Thus, the findings discussed 
below only present a partial picture of how community protests are viewed by those 






5.3.1 The Regulation of Gatherings Act as a measure of protest 
‘legitimacy’ 
 
In the interview discussions with participants about the factors that inform municipal 
responses to community protests, community compliance with the administrative 
procedures of the RGA emerged as a recurring theme. Participants specifically 
emphasised that communities have a responsibility to apply for permission to protest.  
This result is consistent with the findings of Duncan (2014; 2016) who established that 
there has been a tendency across South African municipalities to conflate the 
requirement to provide notice of intent to demonstrate or picket as a permission-
seeking exercise. Similarly, in this dissertation, it was apparent that participants were 
drawing on the convention contained in the RGA that stipulates that conveners of 
protests must provide at least seven days’ prior notice of the intention to protest or 
picket when they articulated that communities need to apply to protest. For example, 
Katlego commented:  
 
If they followed the proper process, there will be a person who is ready 
to deal with their demands, the institution will be responsible for their 
safety if they march from this point to this point. There will be metro 
police that accompany them. Thirdly, they will be permitted to do that. 
No other authority will attack them, while they are doing their marching. 
(Katlego, interview 5 November 2019) 
 
Here Katlego describes how the municipality might respond to community protests it 
considers as having followed the “proper process”. From his standpoint, it is possible 
to deduce that when communities comply with the procedural aspects of the RGA, the 
municipality might be more likely to respond to community protests in a manner that 
is accommodative to the demands of protesters. Katlego emphasises that if 
communities follow the “proper process” an official will be available to address their 
demands. Here, following the “proper process” possibly implies that communities must 
meet certain preconditions for their protests to be considered as procedurally 
compliant by the municipality. Participants often described the ‘proper process’ as 
communities having to seek permission before engaging in protest action. Thus, in 





automatically necessitates a political response from the CTMM – even if this merely 
means the deployment of an official to address the community. This arguably 
represents an illustration of how legitimacy could be attributed to a community protest. 
He further notes in instances where community protests are compliant with the 
procedural aspects of the RGA, such protests are less likely to be met with force from 
the authorities. However, Katlego’s perspective leaves room for contemplating the 
extent to which the same standards would apply under conditions where communities 
have not provided notice of their intention to protest. This would be particularly crucial 
in instances where communities turn to the streets because their attempts at 
communicating their grievances with the municipality had failed. Similarly, Natalie 
commented: 
 
Of course, if you want to protest, you first have to write to the Metro 
Police to get permission from them, then we would know the planned 
protests. (Natalie, interview 6 November 2019) 
 
Natalie’s comment also emphasises that communities have to seek permission to 
protest to ensure that the municipality is aware of any planned protests. Even though 
she does not provide insights into which grounds permission to protest is allowed or 
disallowed, the idea of community compliance with the procedural aspects, as a 
prerequisite, is evident in Natalie’s view. It might well be the case that prior knowledge 
of protests assists the municipality in developing appropriate responses to community 
protests. However, it is possible to infer in instances where communities are granted 
permission to protest, as articulated by Natalie, those protests are likely considered 
as legitimate. 
When Natalie and Katlego’s expressions about ‘applying to protest’ and 
‘following proper processes’ respectively, are read in the context of the RGA, it 
becomes apparent that there is a misinterpretation of some of the conventions of the 
Act. With specific reference to the convention about notification, the RGA stipulates 
that conveners of protests must provide a notice of intention to hold a gathering at 
least seven days in advance. Interpreting this clause as a process of seeking 
permission is indicative that municipal administrators are interpreting, and possibly, 
applying this prescript of the Act incorrectly. The current study was unable to establish 





the RGA of 1993 empirically. However, the data shows that such misinterpretation of 
the RGA can be linked to a practice of using the conventions of the Act to establish 
the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a community protest, as illustrated by the analysis 
presented above. 
These findings broadly support those of scholars who have studied municipal 
responses using securocratic analytical lenses (see Duncan, 2014; 2016; Royeppen, 
2016). However, the findings of this dissertation contribute to this body of work by 
demonstrating that the misinterpretation of the conventions of the Act may not 
necessarily result in the imposition of administrative restrictions on the right to protest. 
I argue that when municipalities use the RGA to test legitimacy  where community 
protests are considered invalid expressions of discontentment due to the perceived 
failure of communities to comply with the administrative rules governing the right to 
protest, municipalities might be more reluctant to respond to such community protests 
and the associated demands. However, compliant community protests are more likely 
to receive accommodative responses. 
 
5.3.2 Community protests as expressions of political factionalism 
 
In discussions with participants about community protests, a common idea emerged 
that they were expressions of political factionalism. For example, Katlego commented:  
 
We have got those instances whereby councillors, they will organise 
people to fight other councillors. And don't think it will maybe be 
councillors of different political parties, you will find that it is councillors 
of the same parties…so it is internal political squabbles. (Katlego, 
interview 8 November 2019)  
 
In this instance, Katlego emphasises that community protests in the context of the 
CTMM is a by-product of political factionalism. He specifically notes that ward 
councillors sometimes use communities as ‘instruments’ to solve factional battles 
within political parties. Here, it is possible to infer that the specific political dynamics in 
the municipality, such as political infighting and factionalism, influence how 
administrators view the drivers of community protests. This line of analysis is largely 
supported by the research findings of Booysen (2011; 2015) who has established that 





institutions. Here, Katlego’s view that communities are sometimes used to settle 
factional battles, is consistent with Booysen’s (2011) argument that such intra-party 
contestation may be expressed alongside the genuine grievances of communities. 
Katlego’s standpoint provides a window through which we can glean insights about 
the complex institutional conditions under which administrative officials are expected 
to contemplate appropriate responses to community protests. His comment brings to 
light that under institutional conditions where political factionalism is rife, administrative 
officials may find it difficult to discern differences between community protests that 
arise out of genuine community dissatisfaction, and protests where communities are 
possibly used by politicians for purposes of political opportunism. As such, there is a 
possibility that the causes of community protests could be misidentified and 
consequently affect the responses to it. The idea that community protests are often 
expressions of political factionalism was echoed by many of the participants. For 
instance, Tshepo added: 
 
Most of these protests that we experience are political. Most of the 
townships, the ANC will always be there, as the dominant factor. Then 
this is a DA administration, what will then happen, is people will start 
protesting for very unnecessary reasons, because they will want to 
destabilise what our administration has done because it is a DA 
administration. So that will have a negative impact on service delivery. 
(Tshepo, interview 5 November 2019) 
 
Tshepo identifies interparty-political contestation as the leading cause of community 
protests in the CTMM. From his viewpoint, community protests in the CTMM are 
primarily a manifestation of the ANC's attempts to undermine the stability of the DA-
elected local government. Tshepo’s assertion is probable, particularly in light of the 
ongoing turmoil that has beset the CTMM’s political landscape since the DA’s ascent 
into power following the 2016 local government elections. The seeming tension 
between the DA and ANC described by Tshepo could be amplified by the fact that the 
ANC dominates the political landscape at the national level of government. Here there 
is a chance that such tension arises out of what Booysen (2015) describes as the 
growing infusion of the ANC into the machinery of the state. More importantly, a closer 
analysis of Tshepo’s view reveals a sense of frustration imbedded in his account when 





reasons. Here he is articulating the lived pressures of responding to community 
protests when the source of such a protest is linked to malicious political infighting 
between and within individual political parties. He expresses clear concern that 
community protests arising out of factional battles only serve to undermine the delivery 
of services to communities. Even though Tshepo’s observation is important, it also 
demonstrates the risks that may arise when the underlying causes of community 
protests are viewed as by-products of intra- and inter-political party disputes. His 
comment also shows that such an approach has the potential to blur the analytical 
lenses administrative officials use in their assessment of why communities protest. 
This in turn, might inadvertently result in reducing legitimate community protests to 
‘unnecessary’ expressions of political infighting. 
Overall, these findings are consistent with the core claims advanced by 
Booysen’s body of work (see Booysen, 2011; 2015) insofar as it relates to the infusion 
of the ANC into the state bureaucracy. Yet, the current findings provide different 
insights in that they specifically show how the presence of factionalism could shape 
the responses of the municipalities. This analysis has shown that the intensity of 
political factionalism in the CTMM contributes to precarious conditions under which 
administrators are expected to perform their core functions, in addition to responding 
to community protests. Furthermore, such inter- and intra-political party contestation 
is seemingly located at the centre of officials largely viewing community protests as 
expressions of political factionalism. This in turn opens space for administrative staff 
to possibly overlook other underlying causes of community protests with 
consequences for misdirected municipal responses to community protests. These 
findings therefore complement those of previous studies that have mostly shown how 
political factionalism results in the breakdown of municipal service delivery, which in 
turn triggers the manifestation of community protests (see Isandla Institute, 2011; 
Mukwedeya, 2015; Olver, 2018 and Von Holdt et al., 2011). In the next section, the 









5.4 Analysing the factors that inform municipal responses to community 
protests 
 
This section examines the impacts of municipal budgeting and regulatory compliance 
as key institutional factors that inform municipal responses to community protests from 
the standpoint of the participants.  There is also an assessment of the impact of 
political factionalism on the administrative component of the municipality and its 
influence on the development of appropriate municipal responses to community 
protests. 
 
5.4.1 Municipal budgeting and regulatory compliance: A tale of 
contradictory pressures 
 
The analysis of the interview data shows that limited financial resources at the disposal 
of administrators and the legal obligations of complying with financial regulations may 
sometimes place contradictory pressures and demands on municipal administrators 
and politicians alike. For most participants, the limitations posed by municipal 
budgeting were the most important issues affecting the ability of the municipality to 
respond to community protests. This theme is best summarised by Natalie: 
 
The budget is a resource…It's a limited resource. So, you have to 
divide the pie amongst everybody. Now, this pie has been divided 
already. And then somebody comes, wanting a little extra pie or a new 
piece and there is nothing to give. So, you have to take from 
somewhere to cover. (Natalie, interview 6 November 2019) 
 
Here, Natalie draws our attention to the complex resource allocation decisions 
confronting the CTMM, particularly in a socio-economic context in which multiple and 
competing demands are placed on the available budget of the municipality. In her 
analysis of the budget as a challenge to municipal responses to community protests, 
Natalie points out that by the time a community protest erupts the pie has already been 
neatly divided amongst all stakeholders who can legitimately lay claim to any piece of 
the pie. This means that financial resources have already been allotted to particular 
issues prioritised in the budget. Beyond what Natalie states overtly, her commentary 
contains a subliminal message that the municipality possesses substantial power to 





her metaphor of the pie as a budget, is that community protests to some degree 
display elements of greed. Demands placed on the already divided pie are described 
as wanting an “extra” or an entirely “new piece” of the pie. Her view further draws into 
question whether it is legitimate for protesting communities to lay claim to extra or new 
pieces of the pie, as dishing an extra piece of the  pie means that resources must be 
reprioritised to meet the demands arising from protest action. Here, it is possible to 
infer that when specific protests are considered as legitimate by administrators or 
politicians, a chance exists that the municipality might demonstrate a greater sense of 
willingness to re-prioritise financial resources to meet the demands channelled 
through collective communal action. Of course, dishing extra pie is perhaps far more 
complex than Natalie is describing. Any changes in the financial resources that are 
already committed in the budget pose audit implications for the municipality in terms 
of the relevant legislation governing municipal finances. This a challenge that was 
central to almost all participant accounts and an issue that I turn to next. 
Parallel to budget constraints as a key factor that influences the ability of the 
municipality to respond to community protests, participants also indicated that 
addressing demands levelled through a community protest is difficult. This is as a 
result of prior budget commitments and the regulations imposed by the Municipal 
Financial Management Act (MFMA) Act 56 of 2003. For example, Oteng discussed 
responses to community protests in the CTMM: 
 
It depends on what the municipality can afford at a particular time, so 
the budget is an integral part of every service delivery. If you don't have 
the money you can't do it. But remember, an approved budget is only 
what we can spend the money on. We are governed by MFMA so we 
cannot deviate. Unless you do that, it will be irregular expenditure. 
(Oteng, interview 6 November 2019)  
 
This view emphasises that inasmuch as the CTMMs’ responses to community protests 
are complicated by a limited municipal budget, the MFMA poses further restrictions on 
the ability of the municipality to respond to demands that do not form part of pre-
existing projects. This is because responding to unplanned protest issues with 
financial implications hold consequences for the audit outcomes of the CTMM. Here, 
Oteng draws our attention to the complex position administrators are placed in when 





that the MFMA makes it incumbent on administrators and politicians to avoid incurring 
expenditure outside of the items approved in the budget as such deviations could 
result in irregular expenditure and consequently adverse audit outcomes. 
This demonstrates a sense of heightened fear about incurring irregular 
expenditure as an outcome of municipal responses to unplanned and unbudgeted 
demands arising from community protest action. As such, the sense of fear captured 
in Oteng’s statement is understandable to some degree, specifically, since the 
effectiveness of municipalities tends to be measured against their audit outcomes. It 
is also important to point out the key objective of the MFMA as a legislative instrument 
is directed at ensuring that municipal budgets address the needs of the poor and 
vulnerable as far as possible. That ought to be realised through managing the financial 
resources of the municipality in such a way that wasteful expenditure is kept at 
minimum and finances managed ethically and transparently (Chuene, 2006). 
This situation arguably places contradictory pressures on administrators and 
politicians. Here we can notice, on the one hand, that strict compliance with the 
regulatory legislative instruments are preconditions for ensuring that the CTMM 
obtains clean audit outcomes; while on the other, municipalities are expected to 
address demands communicated through protests, that might not necessarily be 
prioritised in approved budgets. In view of this, it becomes apparent that the nature of 
the municipal financial system potentially places the administrators and politicians in 
a conflictual position. They may well be forced to choose between complying with 
financial regulations in pursuit of good governance requirements or satisfying 
community needs that sporadically emerge out of community protest action despite 
the associated negative consequences of doing so.  
The 2019 report of the Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA) on Local 
Government Audit Outcomes painted a stark picture of the CTMMs’ financial 
management practices, which presumably makes it difficult for the municipality to 
realise the objectives of pro-poor budgeting demanded by the MFMA. For example, 
the report shows that the CTMM had incurred irregular expenditure amounting to just 
over 5 billion rand of which about 1 billion rand was identified as unauthorised 
expenditure (AGSA, 2019). Using the definitions of irregular and unauthorised 
expenditure provided in Chapter Three of this dissertation allows for imagining several 





denote, the prevalence of irregular and unauthorised expenditure could imply that the 
CTMM is indeed responsive to addressing demands channelled through community 
protests. For example, the state of irregular expenditure in the CTMM could mean that 
money was reallocated from an existing project to fund resettling a community affected 
by a flood or that a community's demand for recreational facilities channelled through 
collective action was met.  
Yet, the AGSA’s report attributes the CTMM’s poor audit outcomes to “slow 
internal controls and addressing risk areas” and “inadequate consequence 
management for poor performance and transgressions” (AGSA, 2019:118). This 
means that the CTMM has been slow in implementing controls that could ensure 
sound financial management practices to prevent irregular and unauthorised 
expenditure. However, this does not necessarily eliminate the weight of the argument 
of contradictory pressures raised above; in fact, it shows how pressure for compliance 
is reinforced. It is important to point out that the argument presented is not advocating 
for reckless municipal financial management practices. I acknowledge that weak 
compliance may open a vacuum in which corrupt and wasteful expenditure is able to 
flourish. The issue of poor consequence-management could mean that in instances 
where financial malfeasance occur, transgressors are better able to evade 
accountability for misconduct. As such, the strength of the argument presented is that 
it illuminates the paradoxical pressures created by technical compliance with financial 
regulations. This, in turn, enables an evaluation of municipal responses to community 
protests within the limitations of the municipal financial regulatory framework.  
The possible effects of the contradictory pressures, addressed above, are best 
captured in Tumelo's view. He commented: 
 
If you are there, then you see the conditions that they live under and 
maybe it might propel you to have a different view. But the main thing 
here is, even though you can see how people live or whatever, you will 
still be governed by the rules. You still have to comply with your MFMA, 
which you have to follow your procurement processes, you cannot cut 
corners. (Tumelo, interview 5 November 2019) 
 
Here, Tumelo emphasises that even in instances where administrators and politicians 
observe the living conditions of communities, their capacity to act and respond to such 





being able to bypass the legal demands imposed by the MFMA. The underlying issue 
that emerges from Tumelo's perspective is that regulations of the MFMA, in part, 
determine the extent to which municipal administrators and politicians can be actively 
engaged in addressing the struggles of communities. Under these conditions, there 
are multiple possibilities of how such pressures may influence municipal responses to 
community protests. In a broad general sense, this situation may genuinely cause a 
sense of paralysis and curtail the ability of the municipality to address the visible needs 
of communities. Yet, there is also a chance that these pressures may well be 
leveraged by administrators and politicians to mask municipal inefficiency and political 
unwillingness to address the socio-economic and political challenges of communities. 
Specifically, because communities may not necessarily be familiar with the pressures 
imposed by the MFMA on politicians and administrators. As such, politicians and 
administrators have a responsibility to promote public awareness about structural 
challenges experienced by the municipality. Nonetheless, the power of Tumelo’s view 
is that it puts on display the nuances we need to consider in our analysis of municipal 
unresponsiveness in the context of community protests. Here, he exposes the idea 
that municipal unresponsiveness is not simply a consequence of administrators and 
politicians wilfully ignoring the plight of communities or municipal staff being inherently 
unsympathetic to the struggles of communities that use protest to engage in 
democracy. Instead, Tumelo directs attention to the possibility that sympathy may also 
be diluted by the contradictory pressures posed by the MFMA.  
In light of all the issues raised in the analysis above, I argue that while the 
municipal financial regulatory framework is necessary to ensure efficient allocation of 
resources and uniformity in financial practices across municipalities, the same 
framework also poses limitations on the potential responses of municipal institutions 
to community protests. The contradictory pressures resulting from the structural 
design of the municipal financial framework seemingly prioritises institutional 
compliance with financial regulations over the needs of communities. It is within this 
contradiction that municipalities may sometimes be framed as being inherently 
unresponsive to the needs of communities. No consideration may be given to the ways 
in which the structural limitations inherent in the municipal financial system might also 






5.4.2 Stuck in the middle: The influence of politics on administration 
 
The analysis of the data shows that administrative staff often find themselves caught 
up in the centre of factional politics in the municipality. Several participants mentioned 
that political factionalism shapes their day-to-day work activities in fundamental ways, 
which in turn arguably have detrimental consequences for the consideration of 
municipal responses to community protests.  This theme was most vividly reflected in 
my interview discussion with Katlego. He commented: 
 
Some of these things, you will find, here I am dealing directly with 
politics. This political party, they have a strategy to fight councillors 
from the other political party. And I find myself in between as an 
administrator. (Katlego, interview 8 November 2019) 
 
In this instance, he highlights the specific ways in which political factionalism shapes 
his lived experience of being caught up at the centre of intra- and inter-political party 
contestation. Katlego’s description of being stuck in the middle reflects a sense of 
paralysis. From his standpoint, it is possible to infer that political factionalism creates 
unstable working conditions for officials employed in the administrative domain. Thus, 
a chance exists that such political contestation could possibly spill over into the 
administrative component of the municipal machinery. This, in turn, might inhibit the 
development of effective municipal responses that directly target the issues 
communities might be protesting about. It is also possible that such inter- and intra-
political party contestation, depending on its intensity, may provide avenues for 
politicians to place administrators in compromising positions in which they might be 
pressured to make administrative decisions that favour specific political parties instead 
of decisions that benefit the broader public interest. In such instances, this dynamic 
could create and perpetuate a culture of upward accountability to politicians, instead 
of downward accountability to communities; particularly with regard to municipal 
responses to community protests. Here, the analysis can be linked to the findings of 
De Visser (2010) and Sikhakane and Reddy (2011) who established that fragility in 
the political-administrative interface, as described by Katlego, can possibly result in 







Once you are an official, and you don’t have experience, it is going to 
destroy you. You might even be fired. Some councillors are so creative 
they will create a way that will make you to say that you are taking the 
side of those councillors. (Katlego, interview 8 November 2019) 
 
Here Katlego directly addresses the notion of an upward pattern of accountability to 
politicians, which I refer to above. This statement reveals a complex institutional 
environment in which administrative staff could be exposed to undesirable demands 
from politicians. Katlego’s statement demonstrates how accountability could 
potentially be eroded since the employment security of administrative staff is 
sometimes linked to their allegiance to specific political parties. Katlego’s comment 
also speaks of a contextual reality in which levels of mutual trust might be fragile and 
suspicious behaviour might dominate as a direct result of political factionalism, as well 
as the possible co-option of administrative staff into factional battles. It is therefore 
possible to argue that the pressures arising from the situation described by Katlego 
could potentially make it difficult for administrators to execute their duties in line with 
the ethical demands of their positions and without fear of reprisal by politicians. It is 
within this vacuum of precarious employment security and unequal power relations 
that political representatives may find entry points to interfere with administrative 
processes.    
 This influence of factionalism and municipal politics more generally is also 
linked to tenuous working relations between political representatives and 
administrative staff. That, in turn, compromises the effectiveness of the political-
administrative interface of the municipality. In this regard, the analysis of the interview 
data shows that the political-administrative interface of the CTMM is in a rather fragile 
state, which poses several limitations to collaborative work between the political and 
administrative domain insofar as such collaborative efforts apply to the development 
of possible responses to community protests. For example, Tshepo stated: 
 
Maybe somebody from the high office will issue out instructions to us, 
going out and maybe building those shacks again, which is not 
possible because we don’t have budget. But remember that politicians 
and administrators usually don’t talk to each other. Because 





what we are capable of doing. They always think that there is budget 
somewhere, to rebuild shacks and all those things. (Tshepo, interview 
5 November 2019)  
 
This comment reveals important aspects of the state of the administrative-political 
interface of municipal governance in the CTMM. Presumably, municipal responses to 
community protests require collaborative inputs from both the administrative and 
political components of the municipality. Participants have indicated that politicians are 
often amongst the first responders deployed to communities affected by protest action. 
However, Tshepo alerts us to the possibility of a fundamental disconnect between the 
work of administrators and politicians in the municipality. From his perspective, we can 
discern elements of a dichotomous institutional culture of us-versus-them being at 
play. He notes that communication channels between administrators and politicians 
are not exploited to their full advantage. The result of this disconnect in Tshepo's view 
is that it fosters a degree of 'political blindness' – metaphorically - to the realities of 
administrative staff. Here, it is possible to deduce that the sense of political blindness 
expressed in Tshepo's commentary may at times be the source of tenuous working 
relationships between the administrative and political components of the municipality, 
as he further alludes to manifest suspicions of the capacities of administrators to 
perform their tasks competently. This raises concerns about the extent these 
dynamics limit the possibility for effective administrative and political collaborative 
efforts aimed at addressing the demands arising from community protests, as well as 
the development of interventions that can target the causal factors of such collective 
action. 
Natalie’s account of strained political-administrative relations illuminates the 
magnitude of the challenges this dynamic creates most clearly. She said:  
 
They [politicians] decide what's really going to happen with the budget, 
the IDP…and you…do really think…people get demoralised and say 
I'm fixing this pipe, I know what the problem is. I have said what the 
problem is, I have done a report on what the problem is, but you still 
not giving me the go-ahead or the things. I must come today and 
tomorrow it is going to burst there…and I know, I am already seeing it 






In this analysis of the situation, Natalie points out several crucial points of tension 
between the political and administrative interface of the municipality, which could 
undermine possible efforts by the CTMM to respond to community protests. Before 
analysing Natalie's perspective in more detail, it is important to foreground the idea 
that administrative staff are most often more familiar with the technical know-how of 
managing the bureaucratic aspects of government institutions. This means that they 
are relatively more equipped with intimate knowledge of the procedural aspects of the 
day-to-day management and planning of public institutions. This does not imply that 
politicians do not possess similar knowledge; however, by virtue of their institutional 
position within the municipality, they act in entirely different capacities.  Their roles 
presumably revolve around providing strategic political leadership in terms of crafting 
the political vision and developmental agenda of the bureaucracy. As such, for the 
efficient functioning of the municipality, the presence of a symbiotic relationship 
between these two components must exist to ensure that the resources are managed 
as efficiently as possible and to ensure the attainment of strategic objectives 
(Bosshoff, 2011). 
Yet Natalie shows that this possibility is considerably limited within the context 
of the CTMM. Her interpretation shows that unequal power relations exist between 
political officials and administrative staff, as she suggests that “they” [politicians] have 
more control over budgetary allocations. She makes a similar observation to that of 
Tshepo's claim, that the competence of administrative staff at times is undermined. 
This is demonstrated by the deep sense of frustration embedded in her commentary 
when she expressed that the technical know-how of administrators is often ignored by 
politicians. The result is a perpetual cycle of navigating bureaucratic red tape for which 
solutions might already exist. In other words, her expression pinpoints to an 
institutional situation in which administrative expertise is sometimes overridden by the 
interventions of political functionaries in the municipality. Furthermore, the second 
issue emerging from Natalie’s commentary is that this tenuous political-administrative 
interface is linked to a deeper institutional challenge of the demoralisation of staff and 
possible occupational stress (see Mngomezulu, 2020) which in turn poses a problem 
for the optimal performance of administrative staff. The implications of low staff morale 





for communities to suffer the brunt of the spillover effects of demoralised municipal 
staff, as municipalities are essentially service delivery institutions.  
Overall, this section has highlighted that the sense of fragility that characterises 
the political-administrative interface of the CTMM as described by participants is linked 
to the influence of political factionalism on administration and the general politics of 
the municipality. I argue that the perspectives shared by Katlego, Tshepo and Natalie 
show us that tenuous relations between administrators and politicians in the context 
of community protests possibly have a mutually reinforcing impact. Strained relations 
could result in the breakdown of service delivery, which triggers community protests 
as highlighted by almost every stretch of the available data. Their views also show  
that such tensions also present themselves as a challenge in the development of 
possible responses to community protests. These in turn might inculcate a perpetual 
cycle of instability that potentially fuels protests, on the one hand, while at the same 
time inhibiting the development of responses that could be realistically implemented 
within the constraints of the resources of the CTMM.  
 
5.5 Intergovernmental relations 
 
The analysis of participant responses reveals that intergovernmental relations 
complicate municipal responses to community protests, as a result of community 
uncertainty about municipal competencies, weak intergovernmental coordination and 
intergovernmental tensions. 
 
5.5.1 Municipal competencies: Blurred responsibilities 
 
The specific model of decentralisation adopted in South Africa resulted in the 
establishment of a three-tiered government system consisting of national, provincial 
and local government. This fragmentation of the state into distinct yet mutually 
dependent spheres brings with it a specific kind of complexity and uncertainty around 
which sphere of government should assume responsibility for specific matters (see 
Koelble and Siddle, 2012). The following short statement by Kopano powerfully 






They [communities] come to the City and we'd say to them that this is 
not our competency. It will take forever at times for the relevant 
departments to respond. (Kopano, interview 6 November 2019) 
 
With this comment, Kopano raises two important complexities that can be located at 
the centre of the decentralised governance model implemented since democratisation 
in 1994. The first issue surfacing from his perspective is that there is a certain degree 
of community uncertainty about municipal competencies, which is consistent with the 
findings of Coetzee (2010) and Koelble and Siddle (2012).  Here, he alerts us to the 
fact that communities sometimes place protest demands on the CTMM, which it is 
unable to address given that the nature of those demands falls outside of the 
municipality's competencies. This refers to instances in which the municipality does 
not have functional responsibility or powers to address the issues demanded by 
communities. A practical example of this could be a community protest that is directed 
at a local municipality, while the protest demands involve matters relating to education, 
which is a responsibility shared by the national and provincial level of government. In 
such instances, the municipality is placed in a compromising situation as it is unable 
to react immediately, and cannot address such demands. The obvious consequence 
of this is that communities might perceive the municipality as being unresponsive to 
their demands, which in turn, could escalate the intensity of and turmoil associated 
with some community protests. It is this sense of paralysis arising from contested 
competencies that is etched in the first part of Kopano’s statement.   
The second issue embedded in Kopano’s perspective is the challenge of slow 
responses to protest demands from departments located in other spheres of 
government. As the example used in the previous paragraph shows, slow responses 
under such conditions may place undue pressure and frustration on administrative 
municipal staff as they do not have the control or the capacity to respond to such 
demands. While there might be a temptation to reduce the issue of slow responses 
described by Kopano to mere inefficiency resulting from the particular set of 
intergovernmental relations, it is also important to account for the magnitude of South 
Africa's public administration system; the core frustrations are likely to reflect  the 
systemic challenges embedded in the country's IGR framework.  
As such, Kopano’s perspective is possibly reflective of the challenge of weak 





the different spheres of government (see Ile, 2010; Malan, 2005; Mangwanya, 2019). 
His statement further points to seeming gaps in communication or the flow of 
information between his department and that of departments located in the provincial 
or national sphere of government.  This may cause considerable delays in responding 
to community protests. Here, such delays might unfairly imply a failure in responsivity 
of local government to matters over which it does not have control. This argument is 
supported by Booysen (2015) who argues that there has been a tendency for local 
government to be held responsible for ineffectual governance in the national and 
provincial levels of government. 
To return to the problem of slow responses as being symptomatic of weak 
coordination between government departments across the three levels of government, 
it is imperative to note that this is not a problem that is unique to the CTMM.  For 
example, Mangwanya (2019) made similar observations regarding the set of 
intergovernmental relations in Buffalo CTMM Metropolitan Municipality and the failure 
to deliver services to the community. In this study, Mangwanya described similar 
patterns as observed by Kopano, which were attributed to a lack of coordinating 
capacity in the municipality, consequently undermining cooperation between the three 
spheres of government. Gaps in cooperation between the local government and other 
spheres may be the result of unclear roles of different government structures and their 
associated responsibilities (Mangwanya, 2019). Certainly, it can be anticipated that 
such a situation has a negative impact on service delivery, as well as on the 
municipality's responses to community protests. However, the issue of contested 
competencies and weak intergovernmental relations should not be used as an easy 
way out for municipalities; all spheres of government should take some degree of 
responsibility for improving coordination between departments. 
For example, evidence of the challenges described above was apparent in light 
of a protest staged by a group of foreign nationals who lived outside the United Nations 
High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) offices in Pretoria for almost two months 
following a series of xenophobic attacks in the City of Tshwane in 2019. This situation 
resulted in a dispute between the CTMM and the National Department of Home Affairs 
as to who should take responsibility for the protestors’ demands to be relocated to 
safer countries (Moubray, 2019a).  On the one hand, the CTMM argued that the 





the Department of Home Affairs (Moubray 2019a); on the other hand, the Department 
of Home Affairs  maintained that it had “no legal capacity nor the resources to embark 
on the process of identification of the unknown persons and enforce the immigration 
laws of the RSA”(Moubray, 2019b).  
This impasse between the CTMM and the Department of Home Affairs 
continued until a group of concerned residents from the Brooklyn and Eastern Areas 
Citizens' Association and the Waterkloof Homeowners Association served the CTMM, 
the South African Police Service (SAPS) and the Department of Home Affairs with a 
court order to act decisively with the growing crisis posed by the protesters. During the 
court proceedings, Judge Natvarlal Ranchod observed: "It appears this matter will 
require some co-operation between the respondents, particularly the City of Tshwane 
and the [DHA]" (Moubray, 2019a). In the final ruling, Ranchod ordered the CTMM, the 
ministers and the SAPS to “engage the protesters to ascertain their identities and to 
identify which of the refugees are legally authorised to reside or seek legal refuge in 
South Africa” (Mabuza, 2019). As this example illustrates, the court had to intervene 
to clarify the roles and the responsibilities of the different authorities located in the 
different spheres of government. Here, court intervention was necessary to compel 
authorities to work cooperatively. This points to a possibly strained cooperative 
governance relationship between the CTMM and the Department of Home Affairs.  
 
5.5.2 Tension and mutual trust 
 
The analysis of the data shows that tensions in intergovernmental relations possibly 
foster institutional cultures of mutual distrust between officials located in the different 
spheres of government with potentially debilitating consequences on the day-to-day 
work activities of administrators working in the lower tier of government. This theme 
was most vividly captured in Tshepo's commentary when he stated: 
 
When you deal with other tiers of government, they always treat you 
with suspicion. Thinking that, ja, those are the people that are corrupt. 
Intergovernmental government relations are always a bit strained, but 






In this instance, Tshepo referred to the challenges that complicated the execution of 
his duties as an administrative official in the CTMM. He draws attention to the 
existence of a sense of distrust by officials located in other spheres of government in 
the ability of local government officials to perform its functions appropriately. In the 
interview room I sensed a sense of discomfort in Tshepo as he made this statement 
as he turned tilted his head sideways and broke eye contact with me during this 
specific moment. Based on what he said and my observations of Tshepo’s behaviour, 
this came across as a possible source of additional stress of working in an already 
complex and demanding political context. It is therefore also unsurprising that Tshepo 
attributed the challenge of strained relations between the CTMM and other spheres of 
government, to a sense of existent distrust. This occurs even though the Constitution 
envisages a cooperative mode of governance between the different spheres of 
government through practising mutual trust. Yet Tshepo's view is indicative of tensions 
that could hinder the effective functioning of intergovernmental relations. It can be 
inferred that such tensions may have a negative effect on staff morale and weak levels 
of cooperation which could undermine integrated intergovernmental responses to 
community protest demands relating to shared responsibilities between the different 
levels of government. However, Tshepo closes his statement by expressing that “we 
get along”. Here it possible to infer that the problem may not be particularly 
widespread, but that it is still important given that he had opened up a conversation 




I commenced this chapter with a descriptive overview of the recent political history of 
the CTMM in which I highlighted the extent of the instability and dysfunctionality of the 
municipality. This section thus provided a snapshot of the socio-political institutional 
context in which the findings of this study can be located.  
First, I analysed municipal responses to community protests. Here, I 
established two main categories of municipal responses: political and administrative 
responses. Political responses assist the municipality in mitigating the escalation of 
community protests. On the other hand, administrative responses are primarily 





absence from the lived realities of communities by municipal political and 
administrative officials. This two-way conceptualisation of municipal responses to 
community protests were informed by participant reflections about the nature of 
municipal responses to community protests.  
Second, I analysed how community protests are viewed by municipal officials. 
Here, I presented two main findings. The analysis revealed that officials viewed one 
clause of the RGA that pertains to conveners providing notice of their intention to 
protest as an application to protest process. This finding confirmed the claim advanced 
by Duncan (2016) that municipalities in South Africa often incorrectly interpret this 
clause as permission-seeking exercises. However, this finding departs from Duncan’s 
in that I argue this misinterpretation of this clause of the RGA is effectively 
operationalised as an instrument to determine the legitimacy or illegitimacy of 
community protests. I also found that participants often viewed community protests as 
expressions of political factionalism. The analysis specifically showcased how political 
factionalism at the local government level creates volatile working conditions for 
administrative staff. I argued that this trend could possibly result in the misidentification 
of the underlying causes of community protests and consequently misdirected 
municipal responses.  
Third, I also examined the factors that influence municipal responses to 
community protests. The analysis of the interview data revealed that municipal 
budgeting processes and institutional emphasis on compliance with the financial 
regulations that govern municipal finances often created contradictory pressures for 
administrators and politicians.  Here, I argued these issues may contribute to the 
reactive character of administrative municipal responses and weak responsiveness to 
community demands. Finally, I detected that fragility in the political-administrative 
interface of the CTMM seems to undermine collaborative work required by politicians 
and administrators. Here, I contended that such tensions sometimes feed instability 
which in turn fuels protests and undermines the contemplation of effective municipal 
responses to community protests.  
Finally, I also found that intergovernmental relations posed a specific set of 
challenges to the development of municipal responses to community protests. First, I 
advanced that the adoption of political decentralisation in South Africa contributes to 





for certain competencies, reflected in the narrative accounts of the research 
participants. I posited this dynamic partially contributes to creating conditions whereby 
the CTMM sometimes finds itself at the centre of community protests to which it is 
unable to respond as it does not have functional powers to address the specific protest 
demands. Second, I observed that weak coordination between departments located 
in different levels of government complicates municipal responses and sometimes 
places undue pressure and frustration on municipal staff, especially where the protest 
issues fall out of the scope of the municipality’s competencies. Finally, I identified that 
tenuous intergovernmental relations possibly perpetuate institutional cultures of 
mutual distrust across the different levels of government. This, in turn, may have a 
paralysing effect on the day-to-day work activities of municipal staff.  
Taken together, these findings bring into focus the highly complex institutional 
context in which municipal administrators and politicians must contemplate possible 
responses to community protests. It reveals a complex interplay of different 
institutional and structural factors related to the unique political dynamics of the 
municipality and its location within the broader system of multi-level government. The 
next chapter provides a summary of the main conclusions of the dissertation and offers 
directions for future research. 
            
            
















Chapter Six: Conclusion 
 
This dissertation analysed municipal responses to community protests and the factors 
that shape the capacity of municipalities to respond to these protests. Using a 
qualitative single-case study of the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (CTMM), 
this study has generated crucial insights about the main research questions addressed 
by this dissertation. This concluding chapter starts by restating the aims of this 
dissertation and then proceeds with a summary of the preceding chapters. Following 
this, the chapter summarises the main findings and briefly reflects on their importance. 
Finally, the chapter provides directions for future research.  
 
6.1 Restating the aims of the research and summarising the chapters 
 
This study systematically explored how municipalities respond to community protests 
and uncovered the factors that inform their responses to these protests. This 
dissertation, therefore, contributes to debates about municipal responses to 
community protests outside the scope of securocratic analytical accounts which have 
been the dominant approach in this area of scholarship. 
Chapter one set out the context for this study. It located the need to analyse 
municipal responses to community protests against the context of rising levels of 
protest activity in the country and the dearth of literature that examines protests from 
the perspective of municipalities.  
Chapter two provided a detailed examination of the core literature relevant to 
the research questions. This chapter revealed that despite the lack of consensus about 
the frequency and magnitude of community protests, scholars agree that these 
protests have increased substantially since South Africa’s turn to democracy in 1994.  
Chapter three, showed that the current model of decentralised municipal 
governance was mainly an outcome of the negotiated settlement for a democratic 
country. This chapter further analysed the challenges associated with the participatory 
nature of decentralised municipal governance and the fiscal constraints facing local 
government. Finally, this chapter also demonstrated why existing scholarship has not 






Chapter four justified the adoption of an overall qualitative research design and 
a single-case study method to answer the main research questions. This chapter also 
offered a reflection on the specific methodological and ethical complexities of 
interviewing elite participants in a politicised institutional context. 
Chapter five presented the main findings of the dissertation. First, the nature of 
municipal responses to community protests were conceptualised as political or 
administrative. The former was mainly implemented to restore calm and order in 
protesting communities, while the latter, reactive municipal interventions that seek to 
address community concerns arising through protest action. Second, the analysis 
further showcased how municipal officials’ views of community protests are likely to 
inform municipal responses to it. Using the RGA as a measure to assess the legitimacy 
of community protests partially determines whether municipal responses are 
accommodative or dismissive of the demands raised by community protests. Third, 
this chapter further revealed that the institutional emphasis on procedural compliance 
with financial regulations and limited budgetary allocations also complicate municipal 
responses to community protests as it places paradoxical pressures on political and 
administrative officials. Next, the chapter demonstrated that the capacity of the 
municipality is also considerably constrained by the influence of political factionalism 
on the municipal administration. In addition, this chapter revealed that tensions in 
intergovernmental relations and uncertainty about competencies complicate municipal 
responses to community protests. Finally, this chapter concludes by summarising the 
key findings and offering directions for future research.  
 
6.2 Conceptualising municipal responses to community protests: Political 
and administrative responses 
 
 
The findings of this dissertation indicate that municipalities, particularly the CTMM, 
respond to community protests in both a political and administrative manner. Political 
responses to community protests often involve the deployment of political officials to 
address protesting communities (see Von Holdt et al., 2011). I argued that this 
response to community protests often aims to restore order in communities disrupted 
by protest activity and to de-escalate community protests. However, administrative 





addressing the protest demands of communities. Here, the analysis revealed that the 
reactive character of administrative responses points to a possible disconnect of 
political and administrative officials from the lived realities of communities as a result 
of the seemingly fragile participatory governance practices that exist in the CTMM.  
However, the effectiveness of these responses is dependent on several institutional 
and structural factors, which the following sections of this chapter address. It is 
important to point out that this dissertation does not propose that political and 
administrative responses are the only types of municipal responses to community 
protests across South African municipalities. Instead, I am arguing for locating the 
findings of this dissertation alongside existing analyses of securitised responses (see 
Duncan, 2014; 2016; Royeppen, 2016) and police responses (see Dixon, 2015; Marks 
and Bruce, 2015; Mkhize, 2015 and Omar, 2006) as an alternative analytical entry 
point for evaluating municipal responses to community protests.  
 
6.3 Outlining the institutional dynamics and structural factors that shape 
municipal responses to community protests 
 
This dissertation assists us in understanding that a complex network of institutional 
dynamics and structural factors associated with the country's decentralised 
governance model informs political and administrative municipal responses to 
community protests. At the level of institutional dynamics, the findings show that the 
RGA is sometimes used as a gauge to measure the legitimacy of community protests. 
They further indicate that the institutional emphasis on compliance with financial 
regulations potentially produce contradictory pressures that curtail the capacity of 
municipalities to respond to community protests and that political factionalism 
contributes to precarious institutional conditions under which administrators work.  
 
6.3.1 The RGA as a gauge of protest legitimacy 
 
This dissertation revealed that how community protests are perceived by political and 
administrative officials possibly shape the responses of the municipal officials to these 
protests. Here, I uncovered that the RGA is sometimes used to assess the legitimacy 
of specific community protests. This finding thus confirms the argument advanced by 





certain conventions of the RGA before they can engage in protest action is erroneously 
construed as permission-seeking exercises by political and administrative officials. Yet 
this dissertation extends Duncan's argument by demonstrating that this 
misinterpretation of the RGA, analytically, represents more than the imposition of prior 
administrative restrictions of the right of communities to protest. Instead, I argue, that 
when the RGA is used to gauge the legitimacy of community protests, some protests 
risk being invalidated due to the perceived procedural non-compliance of communities 
with the conventions of the RGA. This trend could possibly foster a sense of reluctance 
amongst municipal officials to respond to such community protests and the associated 
demands. On the other hand, community protests that are perceived as procedurally 
compliant by officials might receive more accommodative municipal responses. These 
observations are crucial as they demonstrate that protesting communities could further 
suffer unintentional institutional prejudice due to the technical misinterpretation and 
application of the RGA by political and administrative officials. It is therefore crucial 
that officials who are directly involved in responding to community protests fully 
understand the purpose and conventions of the RGA. 
 
6.3.2 Prioritising regulatory compliance over community needs 
 
Consistent with the literature, the findings of this dissertation broadly support the 
importance of maintaining sound internal financial controls, eliminating unscrupulous 
financial misconduct, and not appointing inappropriately qualified staff to manage 
municipal finances (see Ambe, 2016; Cronje et al., 2014; Koelble and Siddle, 2012; 
Madumo, 2015; Ntonzima, 2011).  These financial governance challenges weaken the 
fiscal viability of municipalities and eat into already limited fiscal resources. This 
erodes municipal capacity to perform their developmental functions and could trigger 
the manifestation of community protests. However, this dissertation makes a vital 
contribution to these debates by demonstrating the specific ways in which the legal 
and institutional emphasis on procedural compliance with financial regulations 
governing municipal finances place contradictory pressures on political and 
administrative officials. The analysis of the data revealed that while the institutional 
emphasis on compliance with prescribed financial regulations is necessary  as it 
enables consistency and uniformity in the financial management practices across 





respond to community protests in a manner that is accommodative of their demands. 
Political and administrative officials have to choose between complying with the 
relevant financial regulations in order to meet good governance requirements, or  
incurring adverse audit outcomes for responding to community protest demands that 
often do not form part of approved budget votes. It is thus in this context of the 
contradictory pressures arising from the financial regulatory framework that municipal 
institutions are sometimes framed and portrayed as unresponsive local government 
institutions. This analysis, thus points to the possibility that the rigidity of the structural 
design of the local government fiscal framework prioritises institutional compliance 
with regulations over enabling officials to address community needs and demands that 
arise sporadically through protest action.  
 
6.3.3 The influence of political factionalism on administration 
 
A comparison of the findings of this dissertation with those of other studies confirms 
that fragility in the political-administrative interface may negatively impact the overall 
stability of municipalities and municipal capacity to provide uninterrupted access to 
basic services for communities. The findings echo the work of scholars who have 
established that political interference in administrative processes can result in blurred 
lines of accountability (see Sikhakane and Reddy, 2011). This in turn is possibly 
connected to administrative staff experiencing occupational stress (Mngomezulu, 
2020) as a result of political interference that overrides their expertise. Similarly, the 
findings of this dissertation also confirmed the harmful effects of political factionalism 
on the administration of municipalities that often trigger community protests (see 
Booysen, 2011; 2015; Olver, 2018). However, the analysis of the influence of political 
factionalism undertaken here extends our knowledge of how administrative officials 
experience their day-to-day work at the municipality. It has shown how the intensity of 
political factionalism complicates the working conditions of the administrative staff by 
inducing lived pressures of being stuck in the middle of political infighting and 
factionalism. Therefore, it seems that the instability arising from these contextual 
conditions,  fuels protests. It also potentially inhibits the development of appropriate 





political and administrative officials due to tensions that arise from political interference 
and factionalism.  
 
6.3.4 Uncertain and complex intergovernmental relations 
 
At the level of factors external to the municipality, the findings show that the structural 
location of municipalities in the country's system of decentralised governance shapes 
their capacity to respond to community protests in three ways. First, the move to a 
decentralised model of governance in the country contributes to a degree of 
uncertainty at the community level of which sphere of government is responsible for 
the delivery of certain services (see Coetzee, 2010; Koelble and Siddle, 2012). This 
finding confirms the thesis advanced by Booysen (2011; 2015) that municipalities may 
at times find themselves at the centre of community protests due to failures in the 
delivery of services in other spheres of government. Second, because of the 
fragmentation of the state into distinct spheres (see Koelble and Siddle, 2012), the 
findings of this dissertation confirm the results of previous studies that suggest that 
the weak sense of coordination between departments located in different spheres of 
government contribute to service delivery failures that from time-to-time trigger the 
manifestation of community protests (see Coetzee, 2010; Ile, 2010; Malan, 2005; 
Mangwanya, 2019). While these studies locate weak coordination as the source of 
failed service delivery, this dissertation argues that weak intergovernmental 
coordination poses severe challenges to the development of integrated 
intergovernmental responses to community protests. In turn, this places undue 
pressure on municipal staff to respond to protest issues that are not exclusively 
municipal competencies. Finally, the findings of this study also show that a certain 
degree of uncertainty and mutual distrust characterises the relations between 
municipalities and other spheres of government which could paralyse the day-to-day 
work activities of municipal staff.  
 
6.4 Significance of the findings 
 
 
Based on all the findings presented, this dissertation has demonstrated that municipal 





excessive use of police force or securocratic academic explanations that primarily 
focus on the imposition of prior restrictions on the right to protest. While it is crucial to 
pay close attention to these trends as they could close off space for protest 
participation in democracy, it is equally as important to understand what happens 
inside municipalities when community protests erupt. Therefore, I argue that analyses 
of municipal responses to community protests should consider how the institutional 
realities of municipal institutions shape their responses and account for the interplay 
of influences that emanate from the broader structural environment in which 
municipalities are situated. Adopting this approach in this dissertation brought into 
focus that the efficacy of political and administrative municipal responses to 
community protests depends on various factors. These include the quality of the 
financial management practices of the municipality, the influence of paradoxical 
pressures imposed by the institutional emphasis on compliance with financial 
regulations, weak participatory governance practices, fragility in the political-
administrative interface of municipalities, political factionalism, and vexed 
intergovernmental relations. Yet it is also possible to infer that the same challenges 
contribute to the proliferation of community protests. Taken together, these findings 
thus suggest that a mutually reinforcing relationship exists between the institutional 
and structural dynamics that drive community protests and those that inform municipal 
responses to community protests. This situation is likely further compounded by the 
fact that responding to community protests was never intended as a core function of 
municipalities. The rapid expansion of community protests have also placed multiple 
pressures on municipal institutions to respond to community protests in ways that are 
accommodative of the grievances of communities – despite not having adequate 
resources at their disposal. The findings presented in this dissertation are crucial as 
they answer questions that are relatively underexplored in existing scholarship in this 
area. This qualitative analysis, anchored in the interpretations and standpoints of 
political and administrative officials, is also significant because it captures the 
narratives of officials who are directly involved in responding to community protests 
Thus it provides insights about the complex institutional conditions under which 
political and administrative officials employed at the CTMM are required to consider 
and implement responses to community protests. As such, the findings of this 





community protests by accounting for the complex interplay of different institutional 
dynamics and the formative influence of structural factors on municipal responses. 
 
6.5 Directions for future research 
 
The findings of this dissertation have opened up several gaps for future research. This 
study used a relatively small sample size. Thus, this area of scholarship stands to 
benefit from future studies that use larger samples to document more encompassing 
interpretations of municipal responses to community protests. This approach could 
help us better understand municipal responses to these protests. Linked to this, future 
studies should contemplate the inclusion of political and administrative officials located 
in departments in the provincial and national spheres of government. This approach 
could potentially reveal additional nuances about the nature of government responses 
to community protests.  
Another important avenue for future research is to explore the impacts of 
political factionalism on the lived work realities of administrative staff in more detail. 
This line of inquiry could potentially contribute to expanding the body of scientific 
knowledge in an area of municipal governance that is relatively understudied. This line 
of research could generate crucial policy insights into ways to improve the overall 
institutional management of municipalities. 
There is also a need for future research to explore how municipal staff more 
generally view community protests. Doing this may provide important insights into how 
they understand community protests, thus enabling a much broader analysis. An 
understanding of this data could assist in improving pre-emptive municipal 
interventions that address community needs before communities resort to protest 
action.  
Finally, there is also a need for more in-depth institutional ethnographies that 
allow researchers to observe how municipalities respond to community protests in 
real-time over extended periods. In other words, researchers require access to 
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Appendix A: Consent Form 
 





I                                                                                     agree to take part in the MA 
study by Wilmont Gertse. I have had the project explained to me.  I understand that 
agreeing to take part means that I am willing to:  
• be interviewed by the researcher; 
• answer all questions as openly as possible; 
• make myself available for a further interview should that be required. 
  
No identifiable personal data will be published. The identifiable data will not be shared 
with any other organisation.   
   
I agree to the student recording and processing this information about me. I 
understand that I have the right to decide upon the use of a recorder to record my 
interview. I understand that this information will be used only for the purpose(s) 
explained to me. 
  
I understand that my participation is voluntary. I can choose not to participate in part 
or the entire interview and I can withdraw at any stage of the project without being 
penalised or disadvantaged in any way. 
  
Name  : __________________________ 
Signature : __________________________ 










1. What position do you occupy in the municipality? 
2. What does your job entail? 
3. How long have you served in this position? 
4. What are the positive aspects of your work, if any? 
5. What are the negative aspects of your work, if any? 
 
General questions relating to protests 
 
6. Are you aware of the different types of protests the municipality are usually 
confronted with? 
7. Does the _______(your office) have specific classifications for different kinds 
of protests? (What are they?) 
8. Does your department get informed/briefed about an actual or impending 
community protest? 
9. How does it get informed? 
10. Is your office in any way directly or indirectly involved in responding to 
community protests? 
11. If so, how? And if not, why do you think so? 
 
Immediate and long-term municipal responses 
 
12. Does your department have immediate responses to community protests? 
13. What do such responses entail? 
14. What factors do your department consider when implementing immediate 
responses? 
15. If not, why do you think this is the case? 
16. Is your department involved in long-term responses to community protests? 





18. What factors do your department consider when implementing long-term 
responses? 
19. Overall, in your view, what are the most important issues considered in the 
development of municipal responses, both short- and long-term, to community 
protests? 
 
Factors that inform municipal responses to protest 
 
20. What do you think are the key factors that influence how the city responds to 
community protests?  
21. What, in your view, are some of the main challenges experienced by the city in 
its effort to respond to community protests? 
22. If any, what are some of the challenges experienced by your department in its 
efforts to respond to community protests?  



























1. What position do you occupy in the municipality? 
2. What does your job entail? 
3. How long have you served in this position? 
4. What are the positive aspects of your work, if any? 
5. What are the negative aspects of your work, if any? 
 
General questions relating to protests 
 
6. Do Members of the Mayoral Committee play any direct or indirect role responding to 
community protests? 
7. What is this role? (if at all) 
8. How are members informed/notified of a protest or an impending protest? 
9. How do you view the effectiveness of notification process? 
10. Are community demands raised during protests/memorandums ranked or prioritised 
by the Mayoral Council? 
 
Immediate and long-term municipal responses 
 
11. In your view, does the municipality differentiate between immediate and long-term 
responses to community protests? 
12. How would you describe these two forms of responses? 
13. Does your portfolio contribute to immediate or long-term responses to community 
protests? 
14. If so, in which ways? 
15. Overall, in your view, what are the most important issues considered in the 











Factors that inform municipal responses to protest 
 
16. What do you think are the key factors that influence how the City responds to 
community protests?  
17. What, in your view, are some of the main challenges that the City experiences 
in its effort to respond to community protests? 
18. If any, what are some of the challenges experienced by your Department in its 
efforts to respond to community protests?  
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